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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
‘Every age, every culture, every custom and tradition has it s own character, its own weakness 
and its own strength, its beauties and cruelties; it accepts certain sufferings as a matter of 
course, puts up patiently with certain evils. Human life is reduced to real suffering, to hell, only 
when two ages, two cultures and religions overlap.’ H Hesse : German Novelist and Poet. 
Won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1946, (1877-1962). 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The influence of culture and religion in children’s rights is evident at both 
international and municipal law levels. At the international level, the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) attempts to take due account of the importance 
of traditions and cultural values of each people for the protection and harmonious 
development of the child.1 At the municipal level, it is undeniable that 
conceptions of what is good for children and what is in their interests, their 
recognised entitlements and rights and the ways of securing them and their 
duties and obligations towards other family members are to a very large extent 
dependent upon the traditional and cultural dynamics of any given society.2 
Religious and cultural values therefore provide the individual and communal 
worldview through which children’s rights are defined, realised and through which 
conceptions such as childhood and processes of childrearing are understood. 
From this, it becomes evident that to fully explore any aspect of children’s rights it 
is important that one explore the manner in which the universal norms 
entrenched in the international and municipal law interact with regional and 
municipal peculiarities and how this interaction influences our understanding of 
children’s rights.   
 
 
 
                                            
1 Convention on the Rights of the Child G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 
167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2 1990. (Hereafter CRC).  
2 W Ncube ‘The African Cultural Fingerprint? The Changing Concept of Childhood’ in W Ncube 
(ed) Law, Culture, tradition and Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa (1998) 11. 
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1.2 The relevance of culture and religion to children’s rights 
When adopting the CRC, the United Nations Under-Secretary for Human Rights 
stated that one of the inherent strengths of the CRC was its capacity to adjust to 
the different cultural and religious values.3  Indeed, the CRC and other 
international and regional human rights instruments do not ignore the sensitive 
issues such as the child soldier phenomenon, child marriages, child circumcision 
and other religiously and culturally justified practices. Rather, they confront these 
difficult controversies in a manner that recognises the ability of deeply held 
values to either frustrate or facilitate the realisation of fundamental rights. 
Furthermore, the children’s rights movement recognises that while children’s 
rights are universal, they cannot be abstracted from their social, political, 
religious and cultural contexts. In the early days of the children’s rights 
movement, Eglantyne Jebb noted that, it was important to develop children’s 
rights in harmony with local traditions, needs and opportunities so that what is 
good is accepted and what is bad rejected.4 Therefore, to advance children’s 
rights, there is a need for us to critically engage with some of the intricate issues 
and questions that arise in our attempt to reconcile universal standards with 
differing socio-cultural and religious values.  
1.3 Aim of study 
The aim of this paper is to explore the influence of culture and religion on the 
rights of the child from a South African perspective. This paper does not engage 
in a debate about whether children’s rights are universal or not. The underlying 
premise is that children’s rights are universal. The paper simply uses the 
universalism and cultural relativism debate as an entry point to a discussion of 
children’s rights in the South Africa. It will explore the extent to which culture and 
religion influence and impact the interpretation of children’s constitutional rights 
                                            
3 J Martenson Statement made at the signing ceremony of 26 January for the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
4 E Jebb (founder of Save the Children International Union 1928) cited in D Marshall ‘Children’s 
rights in imperial political cultures: Missionary and humanitarian contributions to the conference 
on the African child of 1931’ (2004) 12 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 273 at 290. 
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which are modelled on the CRC. The paper will therefore critically and 
comparatively consider how South African courts have attempted to reconcile 
universal norms with historical, cultural and religious peculiarities in defining 
rights and their resultant effect on children and their welfare.  
While there have been considerable academic commentaries on the impact and 
influence of culture and religion on children’s rights at the international and 
regional levels, there has been very little analysis of these dynamics at the 
municipal level.5 South African courts grappled with some of the most difficult 
constitutional questions about children’s rights, their recognition and protection in 
the Constitution and the balancing of these rights with other competing interests. 
The cases that have come before the courts have risen largely within the context 
of the family law. From an analysis of the cases and academic commentaries, it 
is evident that religious and cultural values play significant roles in defining 
children’s entitlements against the state and within the family. While the main 
focus will be on South Africa, international, regional and foreign jurisprudence will 
be used in this thesis in keeping with the South African Constitution that 
encourages the use of comparative sources in the interpretation of the Bill of the 
Rights.6  
 
By advocating a multi-cultural approach to deal with some of the controversial 
issues that South African courts have in the past confronted or may confront in 
the future, this paper argues that the universality of children’s rights cannot be 
misconstrued for uniformity. If anything, ‘organically’ developed strategies that 
take account of religious and cultural values without blindly succumbing to these 
values, are the only way a truly universal children’s rights discourse can be 
                                            
5 See generally G Douglas and L Sebba (eds) Children’s Rights and Traditional Values (1998) 
cited above on the Middle-East, M Freeman (ed) Children’s Rights: A Comparative Perspective 
Dartmouth Publishing (Europe), Aldershot (1996). See also P Alston (ed) The Best interest of the 
Child: Reconciling Culture and Human Rights Clarendon Press Oxford (1994) (international), G 
Van Bueren The International Law on the Rights of the Child Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht (1995). 
6 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 previously 'Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, Act 108 of 1996', substituted by s. 1 (1) of Act 5 of 2005). 
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spoken of in South Africa and the rest of the world.7 In confronting children’s right 
in the area of family law, as is the case with other areas of law, it is important to 
excavate social meaning and purpose behind religious and cultural values to 
bring desired change in the perceptions and attitudes towards children in the 
private sphere.8 Religious and cultural values have a tremendous influence on 
societal perceptions of children and their rights and there is a need for pragmatic 
responses rather than blinkered approaches to tackle those issues that that the 
most resistant to outside intervention and change such as those falling within the 
area of family law. There is no doubt that the value of international human rights 
law and domestic law depends upon its enforceability, practical application and 
on its receiving support from the majority of the people.9 The same is true in 
South Africa. The effectiveness of constitutional and legislative provisions 
affording children rights depend on a cooperative relationship between 
constitutional norms and religious and cultural values or at the very least, the 
ability of these constitutional norms and values to transform deeply held religious 
and cultural convictions that undermine the realisation of children’s rights.  
1.4 Significance of study 
South African jurisprudence on children’s rights has raised some of the hardest 
and controversial issues in children’s rights discourse.10 The resultant case law 
has raised a number of questions about to the family and its rights as both a 
single unit and the rights of its individual members, particularly children. In South 
                                            
7 G Van Bueren ‘Children’s Rights: Balancing Traditional Values and Cultural Plurality’ in G 
Douglas and L Sebba (eds) Children’s Rights and Traditional Values (1998) 15 at 17. 
8 M Mutua Human Rights: A political and Cultural Critique (2002) at 155. 
9 J Heaton and E Davie ‘Children’s Rights’ (1991) 2 S Afr Human Rts Y B 19 at 35. 
10 See Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development (Lesbian & Gay Equality Project 
as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) (2002 (10) BCLR 1006), Hlophe v Mahlalela and 
Another 1998 (1) SA 449 (T), Jooste v Botha 2000 (2) SA 199 (T), Christian Lawyers Association 
v Minister of Health and Others (Reproductive Health Alliance as Amicus Curiae) 2005 (1) SA 
509 (T), Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC), 
Wittmann v Deutscher Schulverein, Pretoria 1998 (4) SA 423 (T), Kotze v Kotze 2003 (3) SA 628 
(T), G v Superintendent, Groote Schuur Hospital, 1993 (2) SA 255 (C), Mthembu v Letsela and 
Another 1998 (2) SA 675 (T),Mthembu v Letsela and Another 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA) and also 
Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2004 (2) SA 544 (C), Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, 
and Others; Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission and Another v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC). 
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Africa and the rest of the world, the family was a holistic social unit grounded in 
inexorable bonds of association that prized hierarchy over equality and 
connection over individuality.11 In addition to this, while the family unit was an 
autonomous entity, seen as a ‘mini state’, individual family members, as such, 
were not. Today, the family has been transformed from being a holistic social unit 
to an amorphous collection of autonomous individuals understood to relate to 
each other as family members in so far as they choose to do so.12 This is not to 
say that the family has lost its autonomy but merely that as a result of socio-
economic changes concepts such as of childhood and family are constantly 
being reconstructed to accommodate notions of both dependency and 
individualism.  
 
South African law has had to keep up with these changes and its own socio-
political transformations that have ushered in a new dispensation that has 
implications not only for South Africa as a nation, but also for other African 
countries that look to the emerging constitutional jurisprudence to confront similar 
issues. After all, because the South African Constitutional text was shaped by 
comparative precedent, it has been described as one of the most progressive 
constitutions in the world. The importance of this study therefore lies not only in a 
better understanding of children’s rights in South African law but also in its 
universal relevance and applicability.  
1.5 Justifying the relevance of culture and religion 
Any discussion that focuses on culture and its relevance to children’s rights 
inevitably touches on the question about the universality of rights. The central 
question in the universalism and cultural relativism debate is the relevance of 
cultural, religious, political, social and economic values in the interpretation and 
application of human rights. In his book International Human Rights and Islamic 
Law, Mashood Baderin provides an insightful and useful definition of the term 
                                            
11 J L Dolgin ‘The fate of childhood: Legal models of children and the parent-child relationship’ 
(1997-1998) 61 Alb. L. Rev. 345 at 352.  
12 Ibid at 355. 
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‘universalism’.13 This term, he argues, is often used interchangeably to refer to 
two different aspects of the universalisation of human rights. The two interrelated 
but distinct concepts are the concepts of ‘universality of’ human rights and 
‘universality in’ human rights.  The former refers to the universal quality or global 
acceptance of the human rights idea while the latter relates to the actual 
interpretation and application of the human rights idea.14 For example, the CRC 
is the most widely ratified international human rights treaty in history with 192 
state ratifications, a feat which may be used to show the global acceptance of the 
idea of children’s rights.15 In addition to this, alongside other group rights such as 
women, children and minority groups the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action reaffirmed the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness of all human rights.16 This worldwide commitment towards the 
promotion and protection of the rights of the child is evidence of the universality 
of children’s rights in an era that had earlier perceived the concept of ‘children’s 
rights’ as a ‘slogan in search of a definition’.17  
 
However, the recognition and acceptance of the universality of rights does not 
deny the relevance of culture or religion in defining the scope and ambit of rights. 
The preamble of the CRC notes the importance ‘traditions and cultural values’ 
while the Vienna Declaration mentions the significance of ‘cultural and religious 
particularities’.18 In addition to this, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child (African Children’s Charter)19 is said to reflect African conceptions of 
                                            
13 M A Baderin International Human Rights and Islamic Law (2003) Oxford University Press. 
14 Ibid at 23. 
15 To date Somalia (signed) and the United States (signed) have not ratified the CRC. Somalia 
does not yet have an internationally recognized government to ratify the Convention and the 
United States since 1995 has shown no intention no willingness to ratify it. See 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf for status of ratifications of principle international human 
rights instruments. 
16 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human 
Rights 24 June 1993 (part 1) hereafter Vienna Declaration paragraph 5 accessed at  
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument. 
17 H Rodham ‘Children under the Law’ (1973) 43 Harvard Educational Review 487. 
18 CRC and Vienna Declaration cited above. 
19 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), 
entered into force Nov. 29, 1999. 
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children’s rights.20 It may be argued that the influence of culture and religious 
values is most apparent from an analysis of the number and nature of 
reservations in the CRC entered by states upon ratification.21 It is evident that 
while there may be consensus about the universal applicability of the rights of the 
child and the abstract principles enshrined in the Convention, considerable 
disagreement continues to exist when it comes to the more concrete issue of 
scope and ambit of these rights and principles. To some commentators, the lack 
of consensus on these issues of substance militates against a proclamation 
about the universality of children’s rights.22 However, if we adopt Baderin’s 
exposition of the two terms, it is evident that the universality of children’s rights is 
settled in international human rights law the universality in children’s rights 
remains a considerable challenge which will always exist in society for as long as 
the human race remains diverse.  
 
Thus, according to Baderin, social, religious and cultural particularities are 
relevant when interpreting rights (concrete level) and not when considering the 
universal quality or global acceptance of children’s rights (abstract level). Unlike 
Baderin, other universalists do not draw a distinction between the two notions we 
have discussed. Some universalists argue that human rights are universal in that 
the human rights ideal, the scope and ambit of specific rights transcend culture, 
religion, society and politics.23 According to Howard, human rights are ‘trumps’, 
trumping any other claim that can be made.24 These commentators are of the 
                                            
20 While the African Charter embraces most of the rights and principles in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, as part of the African human rights system the Charter, like the African 
Peoples Charter emanates from a unique and peculiar ideological viewpoint. See A Lloyd 
“evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African 
Committee of experts: Raising the gauntlet’ (2002) 10 International Journal of Children’s Rights 
179-198. Lloyd notes that the African Charter takes into considerations the virtues of the African 
cultural heritage, historical background and the values of the African civilisation which inspires 
and characterises the rights and welfare of the child.  
21 S Harris-Short ‘International human rights law: Imperialist, inept and ineffective? Cultural 
relativisim and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2003) 25 Hum. Rts, Q 130 at 135. 
22 Ibid. 
23 G Binder ‘Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law’ (1999) 5 Buff 
Hum Rts L Rev 211. 
24 R Howard ‘Human rights and the culture wars: Globalization and the universality of human 
rights’ (1997-8) 53 Int’l J 94 at 95. 
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opinion that any reference to ‘other’ values effectively denies the legitimacy of 
international human rights law.25 While these universalists raise some legitimate 
concerns, their denial of the relevance of culture, religion and social influences in 
both defining and implementing human rights is problematic.   
 
Cultural relativists, on the other hand, argue that human rights are not inherent in 
individual human beings independent of society and culture simply because all 
values are socially constructed and are products of human beings acting in 
particular historical and social contexts.26  Its proponents argue that the dominant 
conception of human rights currently reflected in many international human rights 
instruments is essentially rooted in the Western rationalist tradition. At the core of 
the liberal western conception of human rights is the idea of the abstract 
autonomous individual, rational, independent, self-sufficient, unencumbered and 
unconnected to others except by choice.27 To cultural relativist, some non-
western societies and some conservative communities recognise a particular 
communal conception of human rights which is distinct from the individualistic 
notions propagated by international human rights.28  Like extreme universalism, 
cultural relativism deserves its share of criticism. Its tendency to defer to the 
cultural diversity argument often plays into the hands of the state and is often 
used to rationalise the arbitrary exercise of power that cannot be justified by 
claims of philosophic or cultural distinctiveness.29 At the state level it is used to 
justify abuse or inaction, while in the private family sphere it is evoked to 
                                            
25 Binder op cit note 23 at 212. 
26 E El-Obaid and K Appiagyei-Atua ‘Human Rights in Africa- A New Perspective on Linking the 
Past to the Present’ (1996) 41 McGill Law Journal 819 at 831. 
27 K Mickelson ‘How Universal is the Universal Declaration?’ (1998) 47 University of New 
Brunswick Law Journal 19. 
28 Binder op cit note 23 at 213. See also D Milovanovic ‘The Postmodernist Turn: Lacan, 
Psychoanalytic Semiotics and the Construction of Subjectivity in Law’ (1994) 8 Emory Int L Rev 
67 at 68. ‘Modernist thought was a direct product of the Enlightenment. Modernist thought was 
characterised by the celebration of…the discovery of the individual as an autonomous, self-
directing, coherent and unified being (the idea of the centred subject expressed best by the idea 
of cogito ergo sum – ‘I think therefore I am’)’. 
29 A Pollis ‘Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism’ (1996) 18 Hum. Rts. Q 316 at 
320.  
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perpetuate oppressive practices that undermine the wellbeing of the child and to 
fend of state intervention to protect individual rights. 
 
It has been argued that different conceptions of human rights have their place in 
the development of a truly universal human rights corpus.30 The affirmation of the 
universality of children’s rights does not imply that these rights should be or can 
be interpreted and implemented abstracted from their social, economic or cultural 
context.31 What is needed in debating children’s rights is an internal cultural 
discourse and an intracultural dialogue as processes through which children’s 
rights may be universalised and a recognition of the absence of a single 
overriding verity in each philosophical tradition, particularly as it pertains to an 
individual and that persons rights.32 The children’s rights movement has yielded 
considerable benefits for many children. This is particularly evident in so far as 
the state-child relationship is concerned. However, when it comes to the family-
child relationship, there is still a long way to go. Many negative attitudes remain 
unchanged because of rigid approaches that undermined and overlooked deeply 
held cultural beliefs and practices. As a result, the need for new strategies that 
respect and promote cultural identities of people without compromising the rights 
of the child has risen. It has been correctly argued that the value of any 
legislation adopted will depend upon its enforceability, practical application and 
on its receiving support from the majority of the people. 33
 
 
1.6 Chapter Outline 
                                            
30 See generally A An-Na’im ‘Towards a Cross-cultural Approach to defining International 
Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’ in A An-Na’im (ed) Human Rights in Cross Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for 
Consensus (1992) and M Mutua op cit note 8 and also I Shivji The Concept of Human Rights in 
Africa (1989). 
31 A Lopatka ‘The rights of the child are universal: the Perspective of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child’ in M Freeman and Phillip Veerman (eds) The Ideologies of Children’s Rights 
(1992) at 48. 
32 See generally A Pollis and A An-Na’im cited above.  
33 J Heaton and E Davie ‘Children’s Rights’ (1991) 2 S Afr Human Rts Y B 19 at 35. 
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The entire thesis will comprise of four chapters including this introductory 
chapter.  The next chapter will provide an introduction to South African family 
law, focusing on the recognition and protection of the family and the influence of 
the best interest principle in defining various aspects of the family law and the 
impact of the law on children’s rights. The third chapter will look at one of the 
many aspects of the culture, namely customary law and the rights of the child. It 
will explore the manner in which South African jurisprudence has interacted with 
culture and the rights of the child. It will be argued that the best interest principle 
can be used to reconcile the traditional rift that exists between children’s rights 
and religious and cultural values. The fourth and final chapter will then look at the 
issue of religious beliefs and values and how the courts have interpreted religious 
freedom, vis-à-vis parental responsibilities towards children. The final chapter will 
conclude the thesis, providing a summary of the key arguments made.  
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CHAPTER II 
WHAT’S CULTURE OR RELIGION GOT TO DO WITH IT? THE FAMILY 
AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
‘The FAMILY is the most basic unit of government. As the first community to which a person is 
attached and the first authority under which a person learns to live, the FAMILY establishes 
society's most basic values.’ C Colton 1780-1830, British Sportsman Writer. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One commentator has stated that the family is the ‘crucible for the transmission 
of religious and cultural beliefs’.34 It is through the family that moral or cultural 
values are transmitted from one generation to the next. As we noted in the 
introductory chapter, religious and cultural beliefs have implications for children’s 
rights and, in particular, how their best interests principle is constituted and 
analysed. In international and domestic law, this basic unit on which human 
society is founded provides the natural framework for the financial, emotional and 
material support for the growth and development of its members, particularly 
children.35 However, the recognition and protection of the family unit in law has 
traditionally implied the non-intervention of the state into the private affairs of the 
family save for exceptional circumstances. Professor Van Bueren has argued 
that while there is some change, the placing of the child under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the family has contributed to the general invisibility of children.36  It 
is this complexity that exists between recognition and protection of the family and 
the protection of the child within this unit that this chapter attempts to explore.  
 
Firstly, it is essential to explore the manner in which international and South 
African law defines ‘the family’ and how this definition of impact on the various 
aspects of children’s lives and rights. Secondly, this chapter will consider 
                                            
34 D Brown ‘Freedom From or Freedom For? Religion As A Case Study In Defining The Content 
Of Charter Rights’ (2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 551 at 579.
35 Cited by E Patterson and A Andrews ‘Protecting the child against separation from the family 
environment: Articles 9 and 25 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1996) 16 Child. 
Legal Rts. J 2. 
36 Van Bueren The International Rights of the Child op cit note 5 at 67. 
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whether, given the importance of the family unit in society, it is possible to 
balance the rights of the unit and the rights and duties of individual family 
members particularly as it pertains to children and their rights.  
2.2 Defining the family in international law  
It is interesting to note that while international treaty law recognises the family as 
the basic unit of society and affords it considerable protection, there exists no 
treaty law definition of the concept of family. The Human Rights Committee 
(HRC), responsible for monitoring the implementation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)37, has noted that a treaty 
definition of the concept of family at the international level would be ineffectual 
given the different conceptions of family that exist throughout the world and even 
within a single given state. 38 It has also been noted that the family is still a 
concept in transition.39 Throughout the world social, economic, political and 
scientific changes have resulted in an intense re-examination of the scope and 
meaning of family.40  The traditional definition of family which revolved around 
the marital union and blood relationships between husband and wife, parent and 
child has been expanded to recognise other unconventional familial ties.  
 
As a result, the HRC has noted that state parties are at liberty to recognise 
diverse conceptions of family such as nuclear, extended, single parent and 
cohabiting families and that it is up to each state party to report on how the scope 
of family is defined in their own society and legal system.41 While international 
                                            
37 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 
23, 1976. 
38 General Comment No. 19: Protection of the family, the right to marriage and equality of the 
spouses (Art. 23) at paragraph 2 accessed from 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/6f97648603f69bcdc12563ed004c3881?Opendocumen
t on 10 January 2006.  
39 Van Bueren ‘The International Protection of Family Members’ Rights as the 21st Century 
Approaches’ (1995) 17 Hum. Rts. Q 732 at 733. 
40 See J Dolgin Defining the family: Law, technology and Reproduction in an Uneasy Age (1997) 
at 17. She notes that even the advent and development of assisted reproductive technologies 
and surrogate motherhood complicates finding a definitive definition of the family.  
41 General Comment 19 op cit note 38. 
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law recognises the cultural sensitivity of the definition of family and therefore 
afford states considerable discretion, state parties do not have exclusive 
jurisdiction in defining the family because the definition has to be ‘without 
discrimination’.42 Despite this, it is evident that different regions and states afford 
certain family forms more legal recognition and protection than others. Suffice to 
say, in the face of a wide range of traditional and religious values existing in the 
international community, international law must be both sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate a wide range of family structures and values, while simultaneously 
enshrining universally-agreed upon minimum standards.43
 
In the case of Hopu and Bessert v France44, the Human Rights Committee, 
reiterated its view that the concept of family in article 17 of the ICCPR must be 
given a broad interpretation to include ‘all those comprising the family as 
understood in the society of the State party concerned’.45 However, it placed 
some limits on the concept and held that the concept of family did not extend to 
protect all members of ones ethnic or cultural group nor all one’s ancestors, 
going back to time immemorial.46  
 
The importance of religious and cultural values cannot be ignored in any 
definition or discussion of the family. Evidently, there are different conceptions of 
family for example between western and non-western countries and these 
differences have important implications to our understanding of children’s rights. 
Similarly, conservative understandings of family life are often at odds with liberal 
views of family life. Research has shown that more traditional cultures and 
religions have a strong belief in the structure of an authoritarian and patriarchal 
society therefore restricting conceptions of family that either challenge or fail to 
                                            
42 Van Bueren op cit note 39 at 734. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Francis Hopu and Tepoaitu Bessert v. France, Communication No. 549/1993, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1. (1997).
45 Ibid para 4.  
46 Ibid. In this case, the authors of the communication claimed that France had failed to protect an 
ancestral burial ground constituting arbitrary interference with the authors’ family and privacy. 
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conform to the dominant family structure.47 The influence of cultural traditions 
and values is best exemplified through an analysis of African communitarian 
conceptions of family life which often sit uneasy with ‘western’ individualistic 
conceptions of family. Unlike the dominant conception of family in the west, 
African society is communitarian and revolves around the extended family. Within 
the extended family, each individual member is assigned specific roles, rights 
and duties that make that person a part of the social and economic unit. These 
rights and duties are identifiable through naming. One commentator has noted 
that the naming of individuals within kinship structures defines and 
institutionalises the family member’s social role.48 Cobbah further argues that 
while these roles may appear to be of only morally persuasive value to the 
western observer, they are ‘essentially rights which each kinship member has 
towards his kin. When it comes to naming and roles, under the African family, 
conceptions like aunt, uncle and cousin do not necessarily exist. A mother’s 
sister is a younger or older mother, an uncle a father depending on their placing 
in the family line and a cousin is a sister or a brother. As a result of this child care 
is very much a communal affair and children are referred to as ‘our children’ i.e. 
belong to the lineage or kinship group rather than to two individuals.  It is from 
this conception of family that the commonly cited adage that ‘it takes a village to 
raise a child’ emanates. In addition to this, the harmonization of duties and rights 
within such a community becomes more acceptable than it is in western law.49 
This communal worldview explains the seemingly problematic provisions 
referring to duties that exist in the African human rights system. This conception 
of family, rights and duties has important implications for children and their rights 
that must be taken account of at the international level, despite the fact that they 
are more apparent at the domestic level. Cobbah argues that if the universality of 
human rights is to be taken seriously, international law has to recognise that this 
worldview of solidarity and collective responsibility is for all intents and purposes 
                                            
47 B. J Peens and D. A Louw ‘Children’s rights: A review of children and adult perceptions’ (2000) 
19 Med & L 275 at 283. 
48 J A Cobbah ‘African values and the Human rights Debate: An African Perspective’ (1987) 9 
Hum. Rts. Q. 309-331. 
49 Mutua op cit note 8 at 84. 
 17
as valid as European theories of individualism and the social contract and must 
be taken into account.50 This issue will be explored in more detail the next 
chapter on customary law and the rights of the child. 
 
All the major human rights instruments contain provisions that directly and 
indirectly recognise and protect the family.51 Professor Van Bueren has noted 
that there a three overlapping notions relating to the family in international human 
rights law; firstly, the ‘family’, which occurs in most instruments such as the 
ICCPR and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)52; 
secondly, the concept of ‘family life’, referred to in the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)53 and 
thirdly, the concept of ‘family environment’ which is found in the CRC and the 
African Children’s Charter.54 The CRC and the African Children’s Charter refer to 
both the ‘family environment’ and ‘family’ in the same instrument. All three 
notions seem to cover common ground and, from an analysis of the 
jurisprudence seem to protect the similar interests.  
 
However, whatever term is used to recognise and protect the family in 
international law, it is evident that the definition of family has profound 
implications for children and their rights. One commentator has noted that from 
                                            
50 Cobbah op cit note 48 at 323. 
51 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) articles 12, 16, 18, 25 and 26; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social ad Cultural Rights (1966) articles 10, 13.3 ; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) art 23 & 17; American Convention on Human 
Rights; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
articles 8 and 12, ; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1986) articles 18, 27& 29; 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962) . 
52 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force 
Jan. 3, 1976. 
53 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 
entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into 
force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971, 1 January 1990, and 1 November 1998 
respectively.  
54 CRC and the ACRWC use both terms family and family environment. See preamble of both 
and article 20 of CRC. 
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an analysis of international and regional law protection of family, family life or the 
family environment encompasses a wide range of protections that all depend on 
an examination of the various needs and functions of the family.55 Protection and 
recognition of family therefore encompass the following: the right to marry; the 
right to be a parent; equality between the sexes within the family context; 
protection for children within the family context and the family’s right to privacy. 
From this, it is evident that recognition of the family entails not only protection of 
the family as a single entity but also protection of individual members within the 
unit. As we have already noted international and regional jurisprudence has 
attempted to formulate an all embracing and flexible approach towards what 
constitutes a ‘family’ and determining who is a ‘family member’. However, as is 
often the case, the rift between international standards and municipal law is 
always clearer when one considers local case law.  
2.3 The family in South African law 
South African law contains no specific definition of the family. However, in the 
case of Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and 
Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister 
of Home Affairs and Others56, the court stated that: 
'[F]amilies come in many shapes and sizes. The definition of the family also 
changes as social practices and traditions change.  In recognising the 
importance of the family, we must take care not to entrench particular forms of 
family at the expense of other forms.'57
Relying on this dictum Professors Cronjé and Heaton have defined the concept 
of family as including all people who are blood relations or have become related 
through adoption or marriage, or marriage-like relationships.58 One may argued 
that such a definition is in line with South Africa’s international obligations 
towards the family which require that the definition of family be without 
                                            
55 Y Merin ‘The right to family life and civil marriage under international law and its implementation 
in the State of Israel’ (2005) 28 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev 79 at 87. 
56 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) 
SA 936 (CC) (2000 (8) BCLR 837). 
57 Ibid at para [31] at 960C by O'Regan J. 
58 DSP Cronjé and J Heaton South African Family Law 2nd ed (2004) at 3. 
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discrimination. However, the meaningfulness of such a broad definition is tested 
in the court’s treatment of family. 
 
It must be noted that prior to this judgment, the Constitutional Court in the 
Certification judgment had noted that while the South African Constitution 
contained no express provision protecting the family, it was highlighted that the 
constitutional text contained numerous provisions that indirectly protected the 
institutions of family and marriage.59 One of these provisions was the section 28 
which states that every child has the right to family care or parental care, or to 
appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment.60 While 
this provision has both directly and indirectly been referred to by the 
Constitutional Court, it is clear that it has been instrumental in transforming South 
African constitutional jurisprudence on the family and children’s rights.61
 
In Patel and Another v Minister of Home Affairs, the Durban High Court was 
confronted with a foreign national who had been arrested by the Department of 
Home Affairs who sought to deport him despite the fact that he was married to a 
South African citizen with whom he had children.62The Court rejected the 
respondents arguments that the applicant was not protected by the Constitution 
noting that the Department had failed to take account of the rights of the 
applicants to live together as per the Dawood case and the right of the applicants 
children to family or parental care.63  
 
In one of the first cases before the Constitutional Court to touch on the rights of 
children, the Court in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom64, 
noted that the section 28 rights as a whole imposed obligations on both the state 
                                            
59 Ibid at paragraphs [96]-[103] at 806H/I, 808A, 808D and 808G. 
60 Constitution of South Africa op cit note 6 at s28 (1) (b).  
61 Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development (Lesbian & Gay Equality Project as 
Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) and others cited in note 10.  
62 Patel and Another v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 343 (D). 
63 Ibid at 350F-G. 
64 Govt of the RSA v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (2000 (11) BCLR 1169). 
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and families to provide for children.65 Speaking in the context of right to shelter, 
the Court stated that while the primary obligation to provide shelter lay with the 
family and only alternatively with the state, state obligations towards children 
would be fulfilled by passing laws and creating enforcement mechanisms for the 
maintenance of children, their protection from maltreatment, abuse, neglect or 
degradation, and the prevention of other forms of abuse.66 In a later case the 
Constitutional Court reiterated this point and added that there was an obligation 
on the State to create the necessary environment for parents care for their 
children. 67  
 
However, contrary to the reasoning of the Constitutional Court and Patal, the 
Transvaal Division in the case of Jooste v Botha68 held that while the section 28 
was aimed at the preservation of a healthy parent-child relationship against 
unwarranted executive and administrative action, it could not be used as a cause 
of action for a claim for damages based on a failure to provide a child with love, 
interest, recognition and attention.69 In this case an 11year old boy born out of 
wedlock laid a delictual claim for iniuria against his father to acknowledge him 
and love him. The claim was based on his the section 28 right to parental care 
and the best interests clause. In denying the claim, the court reasoned that the 
right to parental care referred to the custodian parent. The judgment of the court 
was clearly in consistent with both Grootboom and Patel which enforced the 
rights of children to live with members of their families and other cases which 
recognised the rights and responsibilities of non-custodian parents.70 What is 
also interesting is that since the advent of the Constitution South African courts 
have used the children’s right to enforce the rights of fathers of children born out 
of wedlock but in this case was unwilling to enforce the child’s rights on the basis 
                                            
65 Ibid at paras [76]-[79]  
66 Ibid at para [78]. 
67 Bannatyne v Bannatyne 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC) (2003 (2) BCLR 111) para [24]. 
68 Jooste v Botha 2000 (2) SA 199 (T). 
69 Ibid at  201E - F, 202D/E - E/F, 206G, 207B – C, 207H, 208F/G - G/H and 209G. 
70 G J Van Zyl and J C Bekker ‘Unmarried fathers should not have their cake and eat it: Case 
comment on Jooste v Botha ‘(2000) 33 De Jure 149. 
 21
that the law cannot create love and affection where there are non.71 
Commentators have rightly argued that the reasoning of the court creates the 
impression that children have the right to parental involvement only in so far as 
their parents choose to be involved and to the extent that their rights do not 
interfere with their parents’ convenience.72 Furthermore, it must be argued that 
the reasoning of the court was contrary to the principle in the CRC which holds 
that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and 
development of the child.73  Positively, it must be noted that Jooste stands alone 
in the line of South African cases interpreting the family rights of children. 
 
In Du Toit and Another v Minister for Welfare and Population Development, the 
Constitutional Court following from its reasoning in Dawood noted that legal 
conception of the family and what constituted the family change as social 
practices and traditions change.74 This case involved a challenge to pre-
constitutional provisions of the Child Care Act75 that modelled the parent-child 
relationship on the heterosexual norm and implicitly discriminated against same-
sex couples who sought to adopt a child jointly. In addition to holding that section 
17(a) and (c) of the Child Care Act unconstitutional for discriminating against 
same-sex couples, the Court also reasoned that the provisions effectively 
overlooked the best interests of the child and the child’s right to family or parental 
care.76 The court thus recognised that family life is important for child rearing and 
that adoption is a meaningful way of affording children the advantages of family 
life.77 While it may have not been obvious at the time, the approach of the court 
was consistent with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other 
                                            
71 Jooste supra note 68 at 209H-I.It must be noted that the common law has never directly 
enforced the rights of children against their parents but have more recently and increasingly used 
the best interest principle to enforce such rights.  
72 E Bonthuys and T Mosikatsana ‘Law of Persons and Family Law’ Annual Survery of South 
African Law (2000) at 152. 
73 CRC op cit note 1 at article 18 (1). 
74 Du Toit supra note 61. 
75 Child Care Act 74 of 1983 Sections 17(a), 17(c) and 20(1). 
76 Du Toit & Another supra note 61 at para [18].  
77 Ibid.  
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children’s rights jurisprudence which had began to define the family in terms of 
children’s needs rather than from a perspective of the adult alone.78  
 
From this, it may be argued that recognition of a child’s right to family or parental 
care goes beyond the protection against unwarranted executive, administrative 
and legislative acts that prevent the development of a healthy parent-child 
relationship. State obligations towards children under section 28 also require 
positive state action to facilitate such a relationship to enable families who are 
unable to fulfil their obligations by providing them with social assistance and 
other support. At the same time, state obligations under this provision also 
require the state to intervene into the private domain of the home were the 
welfare and rights of the child are threatened.  
2.4 The extended family in South African law 
As we have already shown South African family law appears to be considerably 
accommodative when it comes to defining the child’s right to parental care, 
however, when it comes to family care the courts appear to grapple with 
recognising certain forms of family relationships. While the courts have noted that 
families come in different shapes and sizes, because of the influence of the 
common law in South African family law, there continues to be dominance of 
nuclear family and often at the expense of extended family which exists in many 
sections of the society.  
 
In the case of Bethell v Bland, the maternal grandfather of a child born out of 
wedlock brought an application for the custody of the child.79 The paternal 
grandparents brought a counter-application, and the natural father intervened. 
Awarding custody to the natural father, the court referred to both sets of 
grandparents as third parties who did not have an inherent right to custody. The 
same reasoning was applied in the case of Townsend-turner and Another v 
                                            
78 See generally, B B Woodhouse ‘Out of Children’s need’s, children’s rights: The Child’s voice in 
defining the family’ (1993-94) 8 BYU. J. Pub. L. 321-341. 
79 Bethell v Bland 1996 (4) SA 472 (W). 
 23
Morrow.80 Unlike the facts in Bland, the grandparents involved in this case 
approached the High Court for an order granting them the right to access of their 
grandchild. In a similar type reasoning however the Cape High Court held that 
while grandparents were increasingly playing a role in modern society, under 
common law, apart from the blood relation between grandparents and their 
grandchildren their position in law was similar to that of the father of a child born 
out of wedlock and had no inherent right to access.81  Similar reasoning was 
applied in Hlophe v Mahlalela82, in which maternal grandparents sought custody 
of their grandchild under customary law against the father of the child. The father 
claimed custody of the child in terms of the common law. To avoid applying 
customary law, the court held that because the mother and father of the child had 
subsequent to a customary union, concluded civil marriage, the parent-child 
relationship before the Transvaal High Court was to be decided under common 
law.83 The Court rejected the claim by the grandparents because lobolo had not 
been paid in full they were entitled to retain custody of their granddaughter. The 
court stated it would not enforce an ‘arrangement that smacked of sale of or the 
trafficking in children’.84 The case and the reasoning of the Court in this and the 
other cases raise some fundamental distinctions between the varying 
conceptions of family life that exist between what is often termed western 
individualistic values and communitarian values which now exist simultaneously 
in South Africa’s diverse population.  
 
It has been argued that when it comes to custody and other child related issues, 
western-based law conceptualises custody, access or other family law notions in 
terms of an individual’s right over his/her child. Customary law, on the other 
hand, conceptualises custody in terms of familial and transgenerational rights.85 
                                            
80 Townsend-turner and Another v Morrow 2004 (2) SA 32 (C). 
81 Ibid at 44. 
82 Hlophe v Mahlalela 1998 (1) SA 449 (T). 
83 Ibid at 458E/F--459C. 
84 Ibid at 458E/F--459C. 
85 A Armstrong ‘School and Sadza: Custody and the best interests of the child in Zimbabwe’ in P 
Alston (ed) The Best Interests of the Child: Reconciling culture and Human Rights op cit note 5 at 
158. 
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This is not to say that customary law does not recognise the primacy of the 
parent-child relationship, but merely that certain kinds of ‘rights’ exist based on 
the caring that a relative has done of the child in the past which may seem 
merely ‘moral’ from a western viewpoint but quite authoritative in customary law. 
Interestingly, such recognition is not only a preserve of customary law but is also 
recognised in American jurisprudence for example. In Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland86, the US Supreme Court recognised that the extended family was 
often responsible for instilling moral beliefs in children and taught them 
citizenship and as such, child rearing rights were extended to whoever was 
responsible for preparing the child for additional obligations of being a citizen.87  
 
Therefore, it is argued that recognition of the extended family and the role it plays 
in South African society is long overdue. This is especially so, with the increase 
in dependence upon the extended family occurring in the context of increasing 
poverty and the high HIV/AIDS prevalence which has left millions of children 
without their biological parents. Such recognition would also be in keeping with 
the Constitutional Courts which took account of the social reality that not all 
children are raised by their biological parents and that many are brought up in an 
extended family context.88 In addition to the supportive influence of the extended 
family, recognition of other forms of family life is imperative in constitutional 
democracy that affords legal protections to family members without 
discrimination.  
 
It must be noted that in addition to the definition of family life, the protection that 
is afforded to the family as a unit and with regard to individual family members 
has a considerable bearing on the rights of the child. As we have noted in the 
previous section, the protection and recognition of the family entails not only its 
protection as a unit against unwarranted state intervention and respect for its 
privacy but also the regulation if not monitoring the rights of the child within this 
                                            
86 Moore v. City of East Cleveland 431 U.S 494, 503-05 (1977). 
87 Ibid at 504-6. 
88 Du Toit & Another supra note 61 at para [18]. 
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private unit. No doubt, balancing the rights of the family as a unit and recognition 
of the individuality of the child with recognised rights is a difficult task for many 
courts. In the past and in some societies today, the family was traditionally 
accorded considerable protection from the state that some commentator have 
argued that because of this protection the family unit has a strong capacity to 
construct a buffer around itself resisting state interventions that are intended to 
open it up for the protection of its weakest members, namely women and 
children.89 Increasingly however, international and municipal law has realised 
that protection of the family unit is futile if individual members live in an 
oppressive, coercive or abusive environment.90 State intervention in the private 
realm of the family or home is particularly crucial when it comes to the rights of 
children who rely on this unit to meet the most basic needs. However, in a multi-
cultural society such as South Africa, the differences that exist between various 
cultural and religious traditions that guide societal and parental attitudes in the 
area of parent-child relationships and childrearing methods raise constitutional 
questions that not only directly touch on the rights of children but lay at the core 
of certain constitutional guarantees as they relate to the parents or families. The 
following two chapters will therefore attempt to explore the complexities that arise 
from recognition of the rights of the child and the rights of parents and families in 
the context of religious and cultural rights.  
2.5 Conclusion 
Like every other society, the family is the basic unit of South African society. The 
South African Constitutional Court has recognized that families come in many 
shapes and sizes and that the definition of family though useful, changes as 
social practices and traditions change.91 Recognition of this fact has had a 
tremendous impact on the rights of children and their families. Today, whatever 
conception of family is used in South African case law, it cannot be denied that 
                                            
89 Ncube (ed) Law, Culture, tradition and Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa op cit 
note 2 at 13 
90 Merin op cit note 55. 
91 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs supra note 56.  
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the rhetoric of children’s rights and the constitutional right of children to parental 
care and family care have been instrumental in reconstructing our views of 
family. It is because of children’s rights that the traditional conception of family 
that revolved around the marital union and its consequences has been 
expanded, taking account of the constitutional values and principles and most 
importantly from the perspective of the best interests of the child. Today, the 
South African family embraces both the traditional and the modern conceptions 
of family including single parent and same-sex unions and protecting all forms of 
the parent-child relationships. The approach of the courts has moved the focus 
from the strict adult oriented rights to one that focuses on the needs and rights of 
the child. However, while these developments can only be welcomed, it is clear 
that there are still a few areas that require attention. The focus on the nuclear 
family remains entrenched in a society in which the extended family is alive and 
well across racial lines. There is an urgent need for the law to recognise the role 
that extended family members play in the lives of children if not to respect the 
cultural traditions of a large number of the population, then to keep up with the 
social reality of the post-constitutional South African community.   
 
It is clear from that South African children’s rights discourse has not only 
influenced the recognition and protection of family life but it has also 
fundamentally altered the internal workings of the family unit. The constitutional 
rights of children have not only implied a recognition of the right of children to 
family and parental care in the sense of the right of children to belong to a family 
and live with that family, but has also transformed the traditional family/parent-
child relationship. The next chapter will explore the issue of children’s rights and 
culture within the context of African customary law. It will go into detail with 
threads that have been touched on in this chapter on the African conception of 
family, children and their rights. While the main focus will be on customary law it 
is essential to bear in mind the differing conceptions of family and the best 
interests of the child which exist between customary law and common law.  
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CHAPTER III 
RECONCILING THE IMPOSSIBLE: THE RIGHT TO CULTURE AND THE 
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 
‘Once the application of customary law is considered a constitutional right and not a 
precarious freedom it is thrown into competition with the other fundamental rights. The result 
will be a series of conflicts, especially between the right to equal treatment and the many rules 
of customary law that subordinate the interest of women and children to senior males.’ 
Professor T Bennett (1994) 
3.1 Introduction 
The inclusion of the right to culture alongside the equality clause in the Bill of 
Rights has serious implications for the rights of women and children who are 
often disadvantaged by the application of customary law, especially in the areas 
of personal and family law. As a result of this, the South African Constitution 
recognises the right of persons to participate in the cultural life of their choice and 
to enjoy their culture in so far as such exercise is not inconsistent with any 
provision of the Bills of Rights.’92 International children’s rights law prohibits 
customary, traditional, cultural or religious practices that conflict with the rights of 
the child.93 Despite these attempts to fortify the rights of the child in international 
and domestic law, courts continue to grapple with how to balance competing 
interests when the right to culture is pitted against some other fundamental right 
such as the right to equality. In the international sphere a number of countries 
like Djibouti and the majority of Islamic states entered declarations to the CRC 
that stipulate that it shall not be bound by provisions or articles that are 
incompatible with its religion and its traditional values.94 Similarly in the domestic 
sphere, the cultural, traditional and religious practices and beliefs are often 
justified by reference to the right to culture, which is recognised in almost all the 
major human and children’s rights instruments and national constitutions. This 
                                            
92 Constitution of the South Africa op cit note 6 at s30 and 31. 
93 African Children’s Charter op cit note 19 at article 1 and CRC op cit note 1 at article 5. 
94 The Djibouti declaration, other countries that have attached similar reservations are Iran, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Brunei, Iran and Mauritania accessible at 
UN Declarations and Reservations http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty15_asp.htm 
accessed on 10 January 2006.  
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chapter attempts to explore how South African law has dealt with this difficult 
conflict and its impact on children and their rights.   
3.2 The right to culture and other rights 
Since the early constitutional negotiations the inclusion of the right to culture in 
the Bill of Rights has been controversial especially in so far as the right related to 
other rights. On the one hand of are those commentators who argued and 
continue to argue that in the event of a conflict between the right to culture and 
the right to equality or dignity, the latter must always prevail.95 These and other 
critics found their argument in a purposive reading of the constitutional preamble 
and the table of non-derogable rights. On the other hand commentator like 
Professor Bennett and others argue that no right trumps the other and as a 
fundamental constitutional right, the right to culture must be balanced against the 
other rights as they all have equal weighting.96 It must be argued that the first 
view of the right to culture stems from particular conception of rights as being 
either first or second generation and drawing a distinction between civil-political 
and socio-economic and cultural rights. Such reasoning has no doubt been 
overtaken by the recognition that all rights are interdependent, interrelated and 
indivisible.97 Furthermore, it portrays culture as a constant barrier to the 
realisation of fundamental rights when in some cases common ground can be 
found which facilitates rather than frustrates the realisation of rights. Justice 
Sachs supports the view proposed by Professor Bennett and states that: 
It is important to avoid an unfortunate but prevalent tendency to put customary 
law and the constitutional principle of equality on a collision course, i.e. to say 
that for the one to live, the other must die, or to use a less dramatic metaphor, 
if customs triumphs, equality must fail [or vice versa]. I think this is a 
profoundly mistaken view. Our Bill of Rights is not based on a hierarchy of 
rights, nor is it an assemblage of categorically defined rights sealed off from 
                                            
95 F Kaganas & C Murray ‘the Contest between culture and gender equality under South Africa’s 
interim Constitution’ (1994) 21 Journal of Law and Society 409-33. 
96 T W Bennett Human Rights and African Customary Law under the South African Constitution 
(1994) at 28. 
97 Vienna Declaration op cit note 16. 
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each other. Rather it contemplates the interdependence of mutually supportive 
rights.98  
In an attempt not to put cultural values and the right to culture on a collision 
course, this chapter argues that it is possible and in fact advisable to respect the 
right to culture without compromising the rights of the child. Moreover, the 
universal principle of the best interests of the child can be creatively used to 
facilitate such reconciliation between culture and children’s rights. However, to 
get there it is important that we have a good understanding of the right to culture 
and its importance in the South African constitutional framework. Thereafter, 
through an examination of the customary law especially that dealing with 
succession, this chapter will show that culture not only influences societal 
perceptions of children portraying them in a particular light be it positive or 
negative but also influences societal conceptions of what constitutes the best 
interests of the child and the entitlements of children under law.  
3.3 Defining the right to culture  
It must be admitted that the concept of culture is difficult to define. It has been 
used in a number of disciplines to refer to a wide range of ideas, processes and 
paradoxes.99 For example, in anthropology culture refers to the expression of an 
ethnic group’s speech, thought processes, actions and aspirations.100 In common 
English, culture implies high intellectual or artistic endeavour.101 However, in 
human rights law, according to Professors Bennett, culture denotes a people’s 
entire store of knowledge and artefacts, especially the languages, systems of 
belief, and laws that give social groups their unique characters.102 This definition 
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of culture is in accordance with our understanding of the right to culture in 
international and domestic law.  
 
It has been said that the right to culture encompasses a wide range of 
protections that arose from the incorporation of the principle of non-discrimination 
into jus cogens in the aftermath of World War II.103 This principle requires state 
recognition that all persons are equal before the law and entitled to equal 
protection of the law prohibiting all forms of discrimination.  Originally, the right to 
culture protected rights of ethnic and religious minorities who faced persecution 
and discrimination in Europe in the early 19th century. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) which was adopted in 1948 included a provision which 
simply stated that ‘everyone has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of 
the community’.104 In the 1960s, the right to culture was relied upon by the 
oppressed majority in colonies all over the world to demand self determination 
and by various cultural communities as well. Both the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)105 and the ICCPR106 adopted in 
1966 included a provisions protecting the rights of persons to take part in their 
cultural life and the rights of ethnic and religious or linguistic minorities to enjoy 
their own culture and practice their own language.107 From these provisions it is 
evident that the right to culture can be approached in two ways. Firstly, the right 
can be evoked by both individuals and by communities. Secondly, it imposes 
both negative and positive duties on the state. At the municipal level the right to 
culture is therefore wide in scope and application.  
 
As is the case in international law, the South African law generally protects the 
right to culture in the same way. In the Christian Education case the 
Constitutional Court noted the following: 
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92 at 95 
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The rights protected by s 31 are significant both for individuals and for the 
communities they constitute. If the community as community dies, whether 
through destruction or assimilation, there would be nothing left in respect of 
which the individual could exercise associational rights. Moreover, if society is to 
be open and democratic in the fullest sense it needs to be tolerant and 
accepting of cultural pluralism. At the same time . . . the protection of diversity is 
not effected through giving legal personality to groups as such. It is achieved 
indirectly through the double mechanism of positively enabling individuals to join 
with other individuals of their community, and negatively enjoining the State not 
to deny them the rights collectively to profess and practise their religion (as well 
as enjoy their culture and use their language). . .108
It is from these wide protection of the right to culture that it has been recognised 
both in international and domestic law that the right encompasses the right of 
religious and cultural groups to foster their cultural identity by maintaining 
separate schools, speaking a distinctive language, practicing a certain religion 
and applying a personal legal system identified with the group.109 However, while 
the right to culture enjoys recognition and protection under the South African law 
it must be noted that these rights are subject to both internal and general 
limitation. In South Africa two of the most controversial aspects of the right to 
culture have been the application of indigenous/customary law and the influence 
of religion in so far as they relate to the rights of women and child. This chapter 
however, will only focus on the application of customary law and the rights of the 
child.  
3.4 Customary law and the right to culture in South Africa  
A proper understanding of customary law in the South African context has a 
substantial bearing on our attempt to reconcile the right to culture and children’s 
rights. For centuries, the term customary law has always evoked the idea of 
primitive, traditional or immutable norms that from an outsider and positivist’s 
point of view do not even qualify to be called ‘law’.110 What then is customary 
law?  
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 Hamnett defines customary law as ‘a set of norms which actors in a social 
situation abstract from practice and which they invest with binding authority’.111 
He argues that, unlike positive law, customary law is not ascertained by asking 
what judges and lawyers say is law, but rather ‘what do the participants in the law 
regard as the rights and duties that apply to them?.’112 Thus, customary law does 
not gain its authority from formal acts such as a vote from an assembly but 
derives its existence and content from social acceptance.113 Intrinsically 
connected to the culture of the people whose conduct it is supposed to govern, it 
is subject to constant change and modification.114 For example, in pre-colonial 
customary law, the system of lobolo (bride wealth) required the family of the 
groom to deliver a certain number of cattle to the family of the bride. The delivery 
of cattle symbolised the conclusion of a valid marriage. However, when the 
colonial economy took over, young men abandoned agricultural production and 
migrated to urban areas in search of work. In response to this, the use of cash in 
place of cattle for lobolo became an accepted norm.115 Contrary to the belief of 
positivists, customary law was not antiquated and static. However, in South 
Africa as well as many other African countries that experienced colonisation, 
colonisation resulted in the codification of customary law.  
 
Unaccustomed to such an unwritten and therefore unascertainable system of 
law, colonial administrators treated customary law in an array of ways. In some 
places customary law was totally disregarded and unrecognised under the belief 
that such law was uncivilised. With time, however, customary law was 
recognised and applied but always from a strongly paternalistic and superior 
point of view subjecting it to systems and processes unfamiliar to customary law. 
It was subjected to repugnancy clauses and the formally unwritten law became 
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codified in precedent and legislation to make it fit into the dominant positivist 
legal system.116 Thus, while customary law was recognised by the courts, it was 
not on the same footing, but subservient, to the common law.117 Customary law 
was treated as an inferior system of law and soon became an ‘invented tradition’ 
as it was interpreted and applied by the courts.118  
 
Justice Mokgoro has stated that, today, customary law embodies legislative 
enactments and judicial pronouncements on African social traditions and 
customs.119 It has arguably lost its characteristic flexibility that made it responsive 
to the ever-changing needs of the communities its serves. This is not to say that 
with the formalisation of customary law, its actors or participants ceased 
regulating their lives in accordance with culturally binding norms. Rather, 
customary law continues to operate today alongside the legislated and judicial 
customary law. It is from this mix that we get the terms ‘living’ and ‘official’ 
customary law. Today, the disjunction between official and living customary law 
remains one of the most contentious issues in South African jurisprudence. 
 
For many Africans, the application and recognition of customary in the South 
African Constitution allows them to participate and express their ethnic identity 
while at the same time its application is tied to the assertions of Jan Smuts. As 
Prime Minister of the South African Union, Smuts stated that his opposition to 
equality with Blacks was not rooted in a belief of their inferiority, but rather in the 
concern that racial integration would destroy African culture.120 Professor Bennett 
has rightly noted that: 
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Culture- the basis for preserving customary law as a distinctive legal system-
has ambiguous overtones in the context of Southern Africa. On the one hand 
culture is of political value for developing an African consciousness. It 
embraces the African heritage, the means by which Africans can affirm their 
identity. On the other hand, culture has been the keystone of divide-and-rule 
politics and of a policy of segregation that subjected all Africans to an 
outmoded and often oppressive legal regime whatever their individual 
predilections might have been.121
Today, the South African Constitution recognises customary law through its 
recognition of systems of personal and family law based on any tradition or 
religion.122 The Constitution also entrenches the right of persons to use the 
language and participate in the cultural life of their choice123 and the rights of 
cultural and religious communities to enjoy their culture. The institution, status 
and role of traditional leaders are also given constitutional recognition and the 
Constitution provides that courts apply customary law when it is applicable.124  
 
However, cultural rights are only applicable in so far as their exercise is 
consistent with the Constitution.125 This internal limitation of the right to culture 
and the recognition of customary law in addition of the general limitation on all 
rights under section 36 of the Constitution is a manifestation of the debates that 
surround culture and the society’s most vulnerable groups, namely women and 
children.  
 
The paradox that arises from the constitutional entrenchment of the right to 
culture is something that South African courts have yet to fully address. However, 
on occasion the courts have been afforded the opportunity to engage with 
reconciling this seemingly outmoded and oppressive legal system with the new 
constitutional values. No area of customary law has been subjected to as much 
constitutional challenge as customary family law.  
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3.5 Customary law and children’s rights 
As stated earlier, objections to the recognition of the right to culture and 
customary law are often based on the fear that such recognition would validate 
the discrimination of women and children. As experience has taught, the 
invocation of the right to culture can be and has often been used to insulate 
discriminatory practices against vulnerable members of a cultural community 
from the full impact of human rights review. 126 Any conception of children’s rights 
under customary law was limited to recognition of their welfare rights. Unlike 
under Western systems of law where the state had an overriding power to protect 
all children within its jurisdiction, the parent-child relationship in customary law 
was treated as a domestic matter.127
 
Professor Nhlapo has noted that the link between the family and the traditional 
value systems of most African societies is not difficult to establish.128 The family 
is the foundation on which Africans construct their social lives. As such, the sole 
purpose of customary law is the preservation of the family unit. The preservation 
of the family was achieved and maintained through marriage and kinship ties. 
This was regulated mainly by the men folk in predominantly patriarchal systems 
in which political leadership and decision making were the prerogatives of male 
elders.129 As a result, the rules and institutions that emerged were about women 
and children and not by them, making it possible to mask inequalities under the 
guise of group interests.130 Women were regarded as perpetual minors under 
customary law and had no capacity to own or transact in property or even to act 
as guardians of their own children.131 The lack of recognition of women and 
children’s legal personality and capacity was a pervasive aspect of customary 
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law, evidenced by the fact that the most litigated aspect of customary law in 
South Africa has been the law of succession.  
3.6 Equality and the law of succession 
The two main rules of succession in customary law are the principle of male 
primogeniture and universal succession. While many often consider the principle 
of primogeniture in isolation, it is essential to consider these principles together. 
These rules were explained in the case of Mthembu v Letsela in the following 
way;  
In monogamous families the eldest son of the family head is his heir, failing 
the eldest son’s eldest male descendent. Where the eldest son has 
predeceased the family head without leaving male issue the second son 
becomes heir; if he be [sic] dead leaving no male issue the third son 
succeeds and so on through the sons of the family head. Where the family 
head dies leaving no male issue his father succeeds...Women generally do 
not inherit in customary law. When the head of the family dies his heir takes 
his position as head of the family and becomes owner of all the deceased’s 
property, movable and immovable; he becomes liable for the debts of the 
deceased and assumes the deceased’s position as guardian of the women 
and minor sons in the family. He is obliged to support and maintain them, if 
necessary from his own resources, and not to expel them from his home.132  
In summary, it may be said the rule of primogeniture determines the order of 
inheritance, excluding females and the young while the rule of universal 
succession ensures that property is not divided and that the heir inherits both the 
assets and the liabilities of the deceased.  
 
The South African Constitution guarantees everyone equal protection of the law 
and prohibits unfair discrimination on the grounds of gender, sex, ethnic or social 
origin and birth.133 The principle of non-discrimination is one that is well 
articulated in the CRC and the African Children’s Charter.134 In addition, the 
African Children’s Charter states that any custom, tradition, cultural or religious 
practice that is inconsistent with the rights, duties and obligations contained in 
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the Charter shall to the extent of such inconsistency be discouraged.135 The rule 
of primogeniture may be seen as offending the principle of equality. While it is 
mostly challenged on the basis of gender discrimination, it can be argued that it 
also discriminates on the basis of age and birth. By privileging the oldest (age) 
male (gender) heir, this rule excludes younger male and female children, be they 
‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ (birth and social origin) and all other females relatives 
such as mothers, wives, sisters, and aunts. However, while we may say that the 
rule discriminates against both males and females at the levels highlighted, in 
reality, it is women and female children who suffer most under this system. This 
is especially because of the preference of sons and other male heirs who 
represent lineage continuity over females who are traditionally expected to marry 
or remarry into other families.136
 
Given the centrality of the family unit and the perpetuation of the lineage, it may 
be argued that this is possibly the very reason why women are excluded from 
inheriting under customary law. In an insightful case note on the case of Sigcau v 
Sigcau137which discussed succession to a head of a tribe, Professor Kerr 
acknowledges that succession in the customary law context is relatively complex 
especially when perceived through common law eyes.138 How the courts have 
attempted to resolve these complexities will be explored through an analysis of 
the two leading cases on the customary law of succession namely Mthembu v 
Letsela and Another139 and Bhe and Others v Magistrate Khayelitsha.140  
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3.6.1 The ‘triumph’ of culture and customary law in Mthembu 
Mthembu v Letsela and Another was the first case to challenge the 
constitutionality of the customary law of succession.141 In this case, a mother 
claimed that her seven-year-old daughter born out of wedlock (although this was 
disputed) had a right to succeed to the child’s deceased father’s intestate estate. 
She argued that the principle of primogeniture was unconstitutional as it 
discriminated on the grounds of sex and a prayer was made for the estate to be 
settled according to common law.142 The grandfather, the respondent, 
challenged this claim asserting that he was the rightful heir under customary law. 
The High Court upheld the principle of primogeniture and dismissed the 
constitutional challenge on the basis of the customary law principle. It stated that: 
Tembi has no right to inherit intestate from the deceased. That is so simply 
because she is not the legitimate child of the deceased. It matters not that 
Tembi is a girl. Even an illegitimate son would have had no right to inherit 
intestate from the deceased. The disqualification of Tembi to inherit from the 
deceased in the present matter flows, therefore, from her status as an 
illegitimate child and not from the fact that she is a girl and that the system of 
primogeniture is applied in customary law.143
Thus, in the courts opinion, the application of the principle of primogeniture did 
not amount to unfair discrimination on the grounds of sex or gender. 
Furthermore, any disadvantage faced by Tembi was mitigated by the fact that 
she was not deprived of her right of support from her guardian i.e. from her 
mother and her maternal grandparents.   
 
On the argument by the applicants that the Court should develop customary law 
in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the Court 
stated that the ‘development’ suggested by the applicants would result in the 
application of ‘western norms to the rule of customary law which is still adhered 
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to and applied by many African people’.144 It also felt that any development of the 
customary law was best suited to the legislature rather than the court.145  
 
The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal arguing among others 
that had Tembi been male she would have succeeded to her deceased father’s 
estate. Furthermore, that the customary law rule of primogeniture was offensive 
to public policy or natural justice within the meaning of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act because it was incompatible with the value of equality.146 In full 
agreement with the High Court, the Supreme Court reiterated the assertion that 
there was no question of gender discrimination given that Tembi was in the same 
position with male illegitimate children. She was also not ‘out of home’ since 
under customary law she belonged to her maternal grandfather or his successor 
who was obliged to provide for her.147 In the opinion of the Court, the issue 
before it was not one in which the recognition and respect of previously acquired 
rights would be grossly unjust or abhorrent.148 Both the High Court and the 
Supreme Court decisions were described as huge blows to the position of the 
African’s child’s rights and the best interests in South Africa.149  It is remarkable 
that the all three courts implied that discrimination on the basis of age and birth 
was somehow not as offensive as discrimination on the basis of gender. The 
reasoning of the court with regard to Tembi’s eligibility to inherit from her 
grandfather was also suspect given that even on her maternal grandfather’s side 
the rule of primogeniture would have still applied and her gender would have still 
militated against her inheriting. 
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3.6.2 The ‘triumph’ of the common law in Bhe and Others  
In the landmark decision of Bhe and Others v Magistrate Khayelitsha150, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa found that the principle of primogeniture was 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. The provisions giving effect to 
it in the Black Administration Act, its regulations and in the Intestate Succession 
Act were therefore declared unconstitutional and invalid.151 The facts of the case 
were similar to those in Mthembu. The mother of two minor girls born out of 
wedlock, sought to assert the right of her children to inherent from their father’s 
intestate estate. However, unlike Mthembu, the Constitutional Court expressly 
recognised that the customary rules of succession discriminated on the basis of 
sex, age and birth and infringed the constitutional rights of the child. The Court 
unanimously found that the challenged provisions were unconstitutional and 
declared them invalid because they adversely affected the rights of women and 
children.152 It also noted that as part of official customary law, it was no longer in 
keeping with the practice, the needs and socio-economic realities of the 
communities it was meant to serve.153 It was widely expected that the 
Constitutional Court would arrive at this conclusion given the widespread 
criticism of Mthembu. A more difficult task however, related to how it was going 
to fashion the appropriate remedy for the litigants. 
 
While the Court deferred to the legislature on the gap that was to be left by the 
effect of its judgment in the long run, the Court had to provide interim remedy 
pending the passage of relevant legislation. Three choices were available to the 
Court. These were to: 
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• develop customary law by determining the true content of ‘living’ 
customary law and giving effect to it;154 
• make exceptions in the implementation of the primogeniture rule 
which do occur in the actual administration of intestate succession 
as the applicable rule for customary law succession in order to avoid 
unfair discrimination and the violation of the dignity of the individuals 
affected by it. A form of case by case approach.155 
• apply the Intestate Succession Act. 
The majority judgment rejected the first two options arguing that neither 
definitively guaranteed the protection of women and children’s rights when it 
came to the devolution of intestate estates.156 The majority was of the opinion 
that the only just and equitable remedy would be to devolve the estate of the 
deceased according to the Intestate Succession Act. The dissenting judgment by 
Justice Ngcobo, however, stated that the Court could and should develop the 
customary law of succession in accordance with the Constitution and highlighted 
the fact that that the best interests of the child may be better served by applying 
customary law than the common law.157
 
While it is admitted that, comparatively, Bhe was a better judgment to Mthembu, 
both judgments manifest similar flaws. The main criticisms against these 
decisions rest on two aspects: the manner in which they both apply customary 
law and their failure/reluctance to develop it, and the manner in which they 
dismally neglect the best interest principle which is a fundamental principle of 
both customary and constitutional law.  
3.7 A critique of both Mthembu and Bhe  
On a close analysis of both judgments, one is struck by the dominance of ‘official’ 
customary law in a pluralistic legal system. John Griffiths describes legal 
pluralism as the situation in which: 
‘[L]aw and legal institutions are not all subsumable within one(system) but 
have their sources in the self-regulatory activities of all multifarious social field 
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present, activities which may support, compliment, ignore or frustrate each 
other’.158
Simply put, it is the recognition and application of various systems of law. 
Academics have drawn a distinction between strong and weak legal pluralism. 
Weak legal pluralism implies the recognition and application of other systems of 
law in so far as they are recognised by the state through legislation or case law. 
This was the case prior to the advent of democracy with customary and religious 
law being subservient to the common law.  On the other hand, strong legal 
pluralism means the recognition of ‘living’ law, customs and norms even those 
not recognised by the state.159 If the South African legal system characterises 
itself as a strong plural system, it is disappointing that in these two judgements 
the High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court all 
referred to legislation, academic text and opinion to identify customary law 
applicable to the facts before it when it could have referred to living customary 
law. 
  
In Mthembu, the High Court looked to the academic opinion of Olivier in his text 
Privaatreg van die Suid-Afrikaanse Bantoetaalsprekendes, various pieces of 
legislation and other academic commentators to establish customary law.160 The 
court applied ‘ossified’ customary law ignoring the dynamic nature of culture and 
customary law norms. Thus, the Court recognised that while the Intestate 
Succession Act had removed the prohibition against illegitimate children 
inheriting from a biological father under European law, but held that such 
changes had not taken place under customary law.161 Furthermore, by referring 
to Professor Bennett’s statement that the system of primogeniture was ‘one of 
the most hallowed principles of customary law’, the Court misconstrued this 
statement as a basis for its conclusion that differentiation between men and 
women under this system did not constitute ‘unfair’ discrimination.162 In addition, 
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the court noted that even if hypothetically Tembi was legitimate the ‘concomitant 
duty of support' which vested on the heir somehow minimised the discriminatory 
effect of the rule.163 A simple application of the test applied by the Constitutional 
Court in the case of Harksen v Lane NO and others would have directed the 
court to the conclusion that discrimination on the basis of birth/illegitimacy was 
still discrimination.164
 
By relying on the official version of customary law relating to the duty of support 
the court failed to take cognisance of the changing reality of many people to who 
customary law applies. In the past, families lived in traditional lineage 
communities that ensured that the heir met his obligations towards the family. 
Greed and the dislocation of the family homestead changed the enforceability of 
such duties. The fragility of this duty was obvious on the facts. The respondent 
grandfather had the clear intention to evict the wife and daughter of his deceased 
son who had lived under the same roof with him during the lifetime of his son. 
The South African Law Commission has noted that the reason why South African 
courts have more often than not preferred to rely on the often inaccurate and 
misleading official customary law was simply that it is the most readily available 
and that courts are reluctant to ascertain living customary law.165 No doubt, this 
is a regrettable reality. 
 
Thankfully, in Bhe the court adequately confronted the changing social realities of 
women and children. The court made the important point that customary law 
needed to be interpreted in its own setting and not through the prism of the 
common law or other systems of law as was the case in the past.166 According to 
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the Court, such an approach led to the fossilisation and codification of customary 
law, which in turn led to its marginalisation.167 Unfortunately, after this very wise 
and sound statement, the Court proceeded to make the same mistake that had 
been made in Mthembu. Rather than applying the positive aspects of living 
customary law, which the Court acknowledged had long been neglected, the 
court resorted to applying the common law in its place.  
 
What is common between Mthembu and Bhe, however, is the stark reluctance of 
the courts to develop customary law in line with constitutional values. 168  Both 
cases rejected sound suggestions to ascertain and apply living law. There is no 
doubt that the processes involved in ascertaining customary law may be 
expensive and time consuming.  
 
However, some courts have shown a willingness and ability to ascertain, develop 
and apply living customary law. In the case of Mabena v Letsoalo, the High Court 
developed the customary law of marriage, which previously stipulated that lobolo 
negotiations had to be conducted by the male relatives of the bride. 169  In this 
case the mother of the bride had negotiated the lobolo and the Court held that 
the marriage was valid, arguing that it was not repugnant to customary law for a 
mother, who is the head of the family, to negotiate for and receive lobolo.170  
 
Furthermore, in Mabuza v Mbatha, it was held that customary law of marriage 
evolved in much the same way as all the other aspects of customary law in 
accordance with changing socio-economic circumstances.171 Here, the siSwati 
custom of ukumekeza (the formal integration of bride into bridegroom's family) 
was said to have evolved in that it was practised differently from what it was in 
the past and could be waived by agreement of the parties and their families and 
as such did not affect the validity of a customary law marriage.  
                                            
167 Ibid. 
168 See Mthembu (1998) supra note 139 at 685 and Bhe at supra note 140. 
169 Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 (2) SA 1068 (T). 
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171 Mabuza v Mbatha 2003 (4) SA 218 (C). 
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 These cases provide ample evidence that customary law is ascertainable and 
can be developed. Many studies have shown that living customary law of 
succession has kept up with the changing in socio-economic circumstances of 
the family.172  In many communities, the rule of primogeniture has been modified 
emphasising the importance of succeeding to a deceased family headship, as 
opposed to inheriting his assets. In this way communities have responded 
pragmatically to the needs of the deceased’s children and their primary 
caregiver, regardless of whether that person is male or female.173 By adopting 
such an approach, the courts would not only be fulfilling their constitutional 
mandate to develop customary law, but they will also be giving effect to the right 
to culture of the majority of people who regulate their lives and relationships in 
accordance with this system of law. The current approach of the Constitutional 
Court of substituting customary law with common law through the Intestate 
Succession Act may be criticised as ‘killing’ customary law ‘softly’.174 Some 
commentators have argued that since the rule of primogeniture should be 
preserved because it seeks to strengthen the family rather then the individual 
and has long been assumed to be the ‘keystone of customary law’.175 Omotola 
argues that living customary law has long recognised the best interests of the 
child allowing for families to come up with just and equitable solutions in 
accordance with values that ensure the continuity and cohesion of the family 
unit.176 The main challenge however is how such pragmatism will ensure that 
children’s rights are not compromised as often happens with unwritten systems 
of law.  
                                            
172 See South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 93 Project 90: Customary Law: 
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 Since customary law possesses discriminatory practices and customs such as 
the ones we have discussed and we criticised the approach of the Court in the  
seemingly positive judgment of Bhe, how then should the right to culture and 
children’s rights be reconciled, if at all that is possible?  It will be argued that the 
principle of the best interests of the child provides the benchmark for resolving 
this issue. 
 3.7.1 The best interests of the child  
The best interest principle is the foundational principle in children’s rights law 
articulated in international, regional and domestic law. In South Africa, this 
principle has been freed from its traditional application in the law of custody and 
now applies in all areas were children’s interests are considered.177 However, 
what constitutes the best interests of the child will always depend on the facts of 
each case. In light of its importance to South African Constitutional law. It is 
interesting to note that no mention was made about what was in the best 
interests of Tembi in the Mthembu case. In Bhe, while the court refers to the 
paramouncty clause, it does not engage with it or apply it to the facts before it. 
The only attempt to deal with this principle, albeit indirectly appears in the 
dissenting judgment of Justice Ngcobo. In the learned judge’s view the 
appointment of an indlalifa ‘where there are minor children it may therefore be in 
their best interests, in certain circumstances, that indigenous law be applied’. 178 
This may be so whether or not the deceased is survived by dependents but 
leaves no assets to maintain and support them. The learned judge makes some 
very insightful comments about the role of the African customary law of 
succession in catering for the needs of the vulnerable, young and old. By making 
                                            
177 Bannatyne v Bannatyne (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 363 
(CC) (2003 (2) BCLR 111), De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local 
Division 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC) (2003 (12) BCLR 1333), Metiso v Padongelukfonds 2001 (3) SA 
1142 (T), Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others (reproductive Health 
Alliance As Amicus Curiae) 2005 (1) SA 509 (T), Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population 
Development (Lesbian & Gay Equality Project as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) (2002 
(10) BCLR 1006), 
178 Ibid at [243]. 
 48
reference to the family as a unit, the learned judge makes an important point 
about African traditional values.  
3.7.2 The extended family and the best interests of the child 
One may argue that the majority of the Court in Bhe was of the opinion that it 
was in the best interests of the children for their father’s estate to devolve under 
the Intestate Succession Act, thereby making the children the sole heirs of the 
estate. Justice Ngcobo, however, looks at the bigger picture which considers 
many other estates that may or may not have assets to be fought over. He 
argues that the application of customary law and the Intestate Succession Act 
may serve the best interest of the child in two ways. Firstly, whether or not the 
estate has assets, there will be someone charged with the maintenance of the 
children in the form of an indlalifa who in living customary law can either be 
female or male.179 Secondly, the learned judge recognises that it is always in the 
best interests of the child for the family unit to be protected and kept intact. 
International, regional and domestic human rights instruments all recognise that 
the family environment is the best for children.  In one of her articles on 
customary law Justice Mokgoro has noted that despite the erosion of the family 
unit senior male relatives, at times remotely related, are still enabled by 
customary law to succeed communal family estates and more often than not, 
leave women and children destitute.180 In both Bhe and Mthembu the respondent 
grandfathers perfectly fell into this category as they attempted to evict and sell 
the property of the deceased to the detriment of the surviving spouses and 
children. It is indeed unfortunate that in some cases customary law heirs abuse 
and neglect their duties. However, the actions of these should not undermine the 
numerous undocumented cases of good practice where heirs maintain the 
dependents of the deceased, even at their own expense.  
                                            
179 Research by The Women and Law in Southern Africa Research Trust (WILSA) which has 
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 At the heart of Justice Ngcobo’s dissent is that courts should not negate their 
duty in assessing the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. 
Additionally, he argues that while children are important and vulnerable, 
resources are naturally distributed to ensure that other persons who depended 
on the deceased for their welfare are also catered for.181 This is something that 
the Intestate Succession Act does not cater for as it only recognises the right of 
the nuclear family to inherit. Only in exceptional circumstances will other family 
members are recognised. The attitude of the Court in applying the common law 
can be seen as facilitating the disintegration of not only customary law but of the 
African family unit as inheritance becomes an issue of individual ownership 
rather than stewardship for the preservation of an entire kinship group.  
 
Professor Himonga has correctly argued that inheritance rights must not be seen 
merely as a matter of rights that should be protected by law as such, but also as 
a way of realising the child’s right to life and survival.182 She notes that in many 
instances the inherited property constitutes a major, if not the only source of 
material support of the deceased’s children and other dependents. She further 
notes that kinship solidarity and mutual support obligations have increasingly 
given way to individualism due to changing social and economic conditions.183 As 
such, protecting the interests of the individual family members will require the 
state to remove discriminatory obstacles that prohibit certain children from 
inheriting from estates of their parents.  
In other instances, however, giving effect to this right will entail supporting and 
facilitating positive customary practices which allow for children’s welfare to be 
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fostered and encouraged whatever condition the deceased’s estate is in. The 
current approach of the courts in both Mthembu and Bhe, if anything, does not 
foster the cohesiveness of the family unit. The family, especially in African 
culture, provides individuals with not only a sense of belonging and identity but is 
an incredible support system for the young and the old in a society where old 
peoples homes and orphanages are not a viable option either because of cultural 
perceptions of such institutions or simply because of lack of resources. The 
family remains the institution best suited for the welfare of children. It is therefore 
important for courts and legislators to take cognisance of such cultural values in 
their decisions and articulation of what may be in the best interests of the child. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
It has been said that if society is to be open and democratic in the fullest sense it 
need to be tolerant and accepting of cultural pluralism.184Like many countries in 
the world that esteem a real protection and celebration of diversity, South African 
jurisprudence on the right to culture and children’s rights shows that the 
realisation of ideal is a challenge. This chapter has shown that while South Africa 
has come a long way in accommodating and protecting the right to culture and 
cultural diversity, the emergence of a constitutional democracy has not 
adequately solved some of the more difficult questions. Is it possible to 
accommodate different conceptions of children’s rights and remain true to the 
constitutional values? It has shown that cultural values influence societal 
perceptions of children and their entitlements within the family under the 
customary law and these values in turn impact on children’s constitutional rights. 
As a result of these tensions it is evident that in the battle between articulating 
the right to culture and the rights of the child, South African courts have negated 
the application of the best interest principle. Culture, in particular customary law, 
has been perceived as static and unable to respond to changes in social and 
political realities, therefore unable or willing to cater to the changing needs of 
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children and their families. There is no doubt that in some instances customary 
law, as we know it or as it is applied by the court, has failed to keep up with these 
emerging conceptions of children and their rights. 
 
Justice Sachs has rightly argued that in order to regain its vitality, customary law 
must respond to the lives that people lead now and their sense of justice and 
fairness.185 The denial of the rights of women and children under customary law 
can no longer be justified under the guise of cultural paternalism which has 
resulted in some of the worst forms of abuse and neglect of women and children. 
The family, as it is understood in each society, must be supported and protected 
to cater for the best interests of each of its members. In African societies this 
may be all vulnerable members of the extended family. To facilitate this, the 
courts must not shirk their constitutional mandate to ‘develop’ the law. The 
continued use of official customary law may perpetuate the marginalisation of 
customary law frustrating those who regulate their lives according to this law as 
part of their right to culture.   
 
The positive aspects of customary law of succession must be given effect to and 
infused in each judgement of the court were this law is applicable. The value of 
ubuntu requires a balancing of the interests of society with those of the individual. 
This paper has argued that through the best interests’ principle, the right to 
culture and children’s rights can be reconciled to ensure the well-being of both 
interests. If we abide by the phrase ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ we can say that 
a child is a person because of his/her community, without children the community 
ceases and without the community the child has no hope. It is therefore important 
that were the application of customary law better serves the best interests of the 
child, this law, as developed by the courts in keeping with the constitutional 
values, must be applied. Were the courts are unable to develop customary law 
by either referring to living law or infusing the children’s rights principles, the 
community affected must participate in reaching a solution that gives primacy to 
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the best interests of the child. While this chapter has focused on children’s rights 
in the context of customary law and the right to culture the nest chapter will 
explore the issue of religion and the rights of the child.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION AND THE 
BEST INTERETS OF THE CHILD 
‘The power of a parent to direct the religious upbringing of a child, even when linked to a claim 
of free exercise of religion, may be subject to limitation if it appears that parental decisions will 
jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens.’ 
Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 
4.1 Introduction 
As we shown in the previous chapter the protection of traditional values in 
international and domestic law embraces indigenous or ethnic value systems 
but also religious customary practices, traditions and, perhaps, institutional 
values. 186 In addition to the right to culture, it recognised that freedom of 
religion raises some contentious questions in children’s rights discourse. 187 If 
the family is the crucible for the transmission of religious and cultural beliefs as 
we noted in the second chapter, it is important to explore the influence that 
religious beliefs have on the rights of the child. Like many other jurisdictions in 
the world, the influence of religious values in South Africa is evident in case 
law relating to custody, education and medical treatment. Because of the 
breadth of this issue this chapter will only explore the influence of religion in 
the contentious area of education.  
 
The importance of analysing South African jurisprudence on children’s rights 
and freedom of religion is that it brings to bear some of the complex questions 
that were cursorily touched upon in the second and third chapters. If the family 
is rightly recognised as the entity that is best equipped to cater for the best 
interests of the child since the state is too crude and instrument to deal with 
the changing needs of the child188, when and how is government intervention 
in the parent-child relationship ever justifiable? When it comes to the issue of 
child rearing parents have a wide discretion and constitutionally protected 
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rights which give them considerable influence over the day to day lives of their 
children making important decisions relating to the day to day lives of their 
children. Like cultural values, religious or philosophical values of the parents 
may at one time or another clash with state law or constitutional values that 
attempt to give effect either to the rights of the child or to the state’s 
conception of the best interests of the child. Balancing these sometimes 
conflicting interests is often a challenge that most jurisdictions have to 
confront. This chapter attempts to explore South Africa’s attempt to balance 
these interests. However, as we did in the previous chapter, before we explore 
the case law on children’s rights, it is important that we have a clear 
understanding of freedom of thought, conscience and religion and its 
interaction with the rights of the child.  
4.2 Defining freedom of religion 
The Human Rights Committee has noted that freedom of religion, thought and 
conscience is far-reaching and profound and that it encompasses freedom of 
thought in all matters, personal conviction and the commitment to religion or 
belief manifested individually or communally.189 This right protects theistic and 
non-theistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. 
International jurisprudence on article 18 of the ICCPR, which recognises religious 
rights, has shown the breath of this right in relation to a wide range of issue such 
as parental beliefs190, the rights of religious minorities191 and objections of the 
use of taxes and many other worldview issues.192 It is also recognised that in 
international law it is almost impossible to consider freedom of religion outside 
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the realm of family life. The right has both individual and communal aspects, 
especially as it relates to children and their parents. 
 
At the local level, section 15 of the South African Constitution contains a 
provision protecting freedom of religion that is almost identical to article 18 of the 
ICCPR. For our purposes the most important provisions of the section states 
that: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, 
belief and opinion.  
(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided 
institutions, provided that -   
(a) those observances follow rules made by the appropriate 
public authorities;  
  (b) they are conducted on an equitable basis; and  
  (c) attendance at them is free and voluntary. 
In S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg193, the Constitutional Court defined 
freedom of religion as encompassing  
'[T]he right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to 
declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and 
the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching 
and dissemination.'194
In addition to this, the Court also noted that the right implies an absence of 
coercion or constraint and that freedom of religion may be impaired by measures 
that force people to act or refrain from acting in a manner contrary to their 
religious beliefs.195 Judge O’Regan, in the same case, however argued that the 
constitutional right requires more of the Legislature that it to refrain from coercion 
but also required ‘fairness and even-handedness in relation to diverse religions is 
a necessary component of freedom of religion’.196 In light of this definition and 
our understanding of this right in international law, it is interesting to note that the 
right to freedom of religion has been the subject of litigation in a number of cases 
concerned with the rights of children. The majority of cases have shown that this 
right, like all other rights in the Constitution, is not absolute and subject to 
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limitation.197 It is also interesting to note that a large number of cases that have 
decided in respect of this right concern the rights of parents and children. It is 
therefore important to consider the possible tensions that exist between the 
exercise of this right and the rights of children.  
4.3 Freedom of region and children’s rights 
The CRC contains numerous references to religion that have considerable 
impact on our understanding of children’s rights. For instance, article 20 which 
deals with alternative care and adoption, states that due regard should be paid to 
the desirability of continuity in a child's upbringing and that notice should be 
taken of child's ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background.198 In addition, 
article 30 provides that in those states where religious and cultural minorities 
exist, children belonging to such groups must not be denied the right, in 
community with other members of his/her group, to profess and practice his or 
her own religion.199 Article 1 of the Convention states that rights shall apply to 
each child within the jurisdiction of State Parties without discrimination of any 
kind such as, the religion to which the child or his parents adhere.200 Indeed 
while a number of provisions relating to religion are directed at the child’s right, a 
considerable number of provisions recognise the religious rights of parents in the 
upbringing of children. For instance article 5 calls upon states to respect the 
responsibilities, rights and duties of parents and other family members as 
provided for by local custom to provide appropriate direction and guidance to 
children. Article 14 which deals with the child’s freedom of religion, thought and 
conscience, the CRC reiterates the rights and duties of parents to provide 
direction to the child. However, as is the case under the common law, parental 
religious right are not only subject to limitation by the court in its role as parens 
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patriae but with the recognition of children’s right imposes a further curtailment of 
parental rights. For instance, the CRC states that:  
Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own 
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, 
the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and 
maturity of the child.201
The issue of child participation when the child has reached maturity and the best 
interests’ principle which should be applied in all matters affecting children 
therefore fundamentally alter traditional parent-child relations as we know them. 
It is therefore crucial that we consider the potential areas of conflict that may 
arise between children’s rights and parental religious rights and how South 
African courts have attempted to resolve these issues under the new 
Constitution.  
4.4 Rights, responsibilities and duties 
It is interesting to note that with the advancement of children’s rights the entire 
discourse of children rights has brought with it a change in terminology. The CRC 
for instance refers to terms rights, responsibilities and duties of parents and 
families.202 In the past and to some extent today, the term parental power was 
commonly used in South African case law that dealt with parents, their children 
and the law. Parental power was defined as the complex of rights, powers, duties 
and responsibilities vested in or imposed upon parents, by virtue of their 
parenthood, in respect of the minor child.203 Today however, the term parental 
power has found disfavour in children’s rights discourse as the emphasis has 
moved from the power relationship between parent and child, state and parent to 
the rights and interests of children.204 However, this does not mean that parents 
do not have rights in so far as their children are concerned in as much as 
children have rights where their parents are concerned. In most jurisdictions 
parents have legally recognised and enforceable rights of custody, access and 
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other rights that come with the recognition of family life and which enable then to 
carry out their parental duties. For instance parents have responsibilities towards 
their children in the area of their general upbringing and make various decisions 
about the health, education, the physical and emotional welfare. Parents and not 
the state or the children themselves often have the final say when it comes to the 
language that a child is to be brought up in, where the child should live, who the 
child may associate with, the school he/she is to attend and other day to day 
issues such as discipline.205 While these child rearing issues have traditionally 
been left to parents with very limited intervention by the state, parental rights, 
duties and responsibilities are frequently coming under scrutiny. This is evident in 
a number of South African cases, however, the case that will be focused on in 
this last chapter will relate to parental decision making rights with regard to 
education.  
4.5 Parental religious rights and education 
If one concedes that the primary obligation for the welfare of the child rests with 
his or her parents, it follows that parents have the primary responsibility for the 
education of their children and that they have legally recognised rights in this 
regard. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contained a provision which 
stated that parents have a ‘prior right to choose the kind of education that shall 
be given to their child’.206 The ICESCR and the ICCPR reiterate these sentiments 
by stating that State Parties should respect the liberty of parents and guardians 
to choose for their children’s, the schools which conform to their religious and 
moral convictions.207 The South African Constitution gives effect to the rights of 
parents in the area of education by allowing the establishment of independent 
educational institutions.208 Even within this framework consultative forums are 
constituted in each school which allow parent involvement in various aspects of 
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the school’s functioning and the content of the curriculum.209 As regards public 
schools, the Schools Act210 stipulates that religious observances should be 
conducted on an equitable and voluntary basis.211  It must be noted that while the 
constitutional and legislative provisions may provide guidance with regard to 
formal education, it is important to bear in mind that broadly speaking, education 
in so far as religious rights are concerned, involves both religious (in the broad 
sense) education in the home and in the formal educational system.  
 
Given our definition of the right is and the aim of this chapter in assessing the 
extent to which South African children’s rights jurisprudence accommodates 
diversity it is important that we consider how the courts have dealt with these two 
issues.  
4.5.1 Religious education by parents 
As we have already stated above, the responsibility of the religious upbringing of 
a child primarily rests with the parents. In South African law, the issue of religious 
instruction by parents often emerges in cases dealing with custody. 
 
In the case of Allsop v McCann212, the Cape High Court held that parents have 
the right to direct the religious and secular education of the children. The case 
concerned two minor children whose parents had been married in the Roman 
Catholic Church. Upon dissolution of the marriage, the mother who had custody 
of the children, rejected the formal teaching of organised religion and as a result, 
objected to the children’s attendance to church during the access period of the 
father. The Court held that both parents were entitled to provide religious 
instruction. It stated that any restriction on the non-custodian parent’s rights and 
duties would fundamentally alter the inherent rights of that parent.213 Thus, the 
court was of the opinion that both parents had the right to provide religious 
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instruction to the children when the children were in their charge and the religious 
influence of one parent had no bearing on the rights of the other. The view of the 
court can be contrasted with the statement in Krugel v Krugel, which suggested 
that when it came to matters such as choice of school, religious instruction and 
medical care, the non-custodian parent had no right to interfere with the 
decisions of the custodian parent.214  
 
By recognising the rights of both parents in relation to the religious instruction of 
their children, the Court was evidently weary of eroding the religious rights of the 
either parent which are recognised at common law and are inherent in the 
Constitution. According to the court, the only instance a court would intervene to 
limit these rights would be when the exposure to the philosophical or religious 
beliefs of the parent would be harmful to the child.215 On the facts before it, the 
court was of the view that, exposure to both parents’ worldviews would place 
them in an ‘eminently good position’ to decide for themselves when they could 
make such decisions for themselves.216  While the Court does not engage in an 
analysis of the best interests of the child, it is evident that the Court was of the 
view that the best interests of the child were best served through an exposure to 
a wide range of religious approaches. However, Bonthuys and Pietrse have 
argued that courts should be reluctant to allow religious disputes between 
parents to confuse and upset children and, where possible, children who have 
been brought up in a certain religion should not be exposed to different pressure 
from the other parent.217 Cronjé and Heaton have also argued that where 
differences in religious instruction can cause confusion to the children, the court 
should intervene and decide what is in the best interests of the child.218  
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The issue of what constitutes the best interests of the child in the area of 
religious instruction continues to be a challenge in many cases. Such was the 
case in Kotze v Kotze were the court took an interesting approach to the religious 
rights of parents and children.219 In this case the Transvaal High Court was 
confronted with a divorce custody settlement between the parents of a three 
year-old boy. The settlement read as follows: 
Both parties undertake to educate the minor child in the Apostolic Church and 
undertake that he will fully participate in all the religious activities of the 
Apostolic Church.220   
The Court declined to make the clause a part of the divorce order, holding that 
the clause was unenforceable and not in the interests of the child.  In the Court’s 
view, the clause did not afford the child the freedom that he was entitled to under 
the Constitution and placed him in ‘constraints from which he might never be 
freed’.221 In its view, the clause represented indoctrination of the child and a 
slavish adherence to certain often repeated cannons that essentially negated and 
destroyed a person’s freedom of choice.222 The court stated that: 
If a child is forced, be it by order of the parents, or by order of Court, to 
partake fully in stipulated religious activities, it does not have the right to his 
full development, a right which is implicit in the Constitution, and which is 
expressly referred to in the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, which is part of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, of which the State is 
a signatory.223   
One must argue that in light of the reasoning in Allsop the courts stance parental 
religious rights and children’s rights deserve some comment.  
 
As stated earlier, the CRC recognises the rights of children and the rights and 
responsibilities of parents in guiding and directing the exercise of fundamental 
rights. Like the rights of parents, the CRC recognises that parental rights are not 
absolute and must be exercised in the best interests of the child, taking into 
account the maturity of the child and his/her ability to make independent religious 
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decisions.224  On the facts of Kotze, the Court was dealing with a 3 year-old child 
who had not attained the maturity necessary to make an independent decision on 
religious instruction. Parental guidance in the area of religion, as with any other 
aspect of bringing up children, cannot be seen as indoctrination by parents as 
this would have far-reaching implications. Adherence to a particular diet or the 
inculcation of a particular language in minor children cannot surely be classified 
as indoctrination as many aspects of the socialisation process would fall foul of 
the rights of the child. There is no doubt that the intent of the parents by their 
agreement was not to place ‘constraints’ on the child, which would limit his 
freedom when he reached maturity. Indeed while many people do end up 
following the religious paths of their parents, many do not and for a variety of 
reasons, end up following their own paths.225  
 
Labuschagne, Bekker and van Zyl have argued that while religious beliefs are 
relevant in determining the best interests of the child, a court cannot use religious 
beliefs to disapprove of parental decisions except where a parental decision, 
premised on religious tenets, manifests a total disregard for the welfare of the 
child.226 On the facts of Kotze, it is difficult to conceive of how the clause may 
have undermined the rights of the child, unless it was shown that it purported to 
be binding on the child him/herself for all her childhood. Labuschagne et al have 
argued that to aver that it is a constitutional principle that a child should grow up 
in a religious vacuum is tantamount to state interference in the private practice of 
religion.227 It may be argued that when it comes to religious instruction by parents 
within the home, respect for the religious rights of the parental role entails a 
certain degree of accommodation by the courts as evidenced by Allsop. This is 
not to say that parents have a carte blanche over their children rather, at all time 
the guiding principle should be what is in the best interests of the child and 
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whether there is any potential harm with the exercise of parental rights. While the 
issues may be relatively easy to resolve when it come to relatively younger 
children, the CRC provides guidance that children’s voices must be heard were 
possible. It is a reality that children must be allowed to participate in both private 
and public decision making processed that affect them.  
 
However, while the issue of parental rights in the educations of their children 
within the home is complex, the issue of parental religious rights in formal 
education raise even more profound questions about the extent to which South 
African law accommodates difference.  
 
4.5.2 Parental rights in secular education 
The issue of parental rights over the education of their children has received a 
considerable amount of attention since the establishment of the state. As we 
have already noted at common law parents have the final say to determine the 
education of their children. In the past parents decided whether their children 
attended school and which type of schooling they were to embark on. It is said 
that at common law a father was under no obligation to have his child educated; 
he could put him to work in a factory or a mine when hardly more than an 
infant.228 Nevertheless, it was only when the exercise of this right by the parent 
was unreasonable or capricious that the State dared to intervene. Municipal law 
and international law recognised the rights of parents to influence the education 
of their children by taking them or establishing independent schools which 
allowed the parent to exercise his/her rights by instructing his child through the 
linguistic or religious medium of his choice.229 In the American case of Meyer v. 
Nebraska, the Supreme Court held that several state statutes prohibiting the 
teaching of German to elementary school children interfered with ‘the power of 
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parents to control the education of their own.’230 Today, the South Constitution 
and various pieces of legislation, while making education compulsory, allow for 
the establishment of independent and state schools from which children can 
receive an education. Parents who fail to comply with provisions that provide for 
the compulsory education of their children can be found guilty of an offence.231  
 
Within the confines of the law parents have a considerable say in the education 
of their children. It must be noted that with the change in lifestyle and socio-
economic circumstances more and more parental duties, care and 
responsibilities are being shifted onto other bodies such as day care centres and 
schools. When it comes to education, parents effectively pass on a crucial 
degree of influence over their child’s development to someone else. Some 
parents thus send their children to religious schools purely on the basis that such 
schools will educate their children in accordance with their deeply held religious 
or cultural beliefs. Others however, may not be able to afford such schools and 
will send their children to state schools.  
 
There is often a degree of tension between the beliefs of the parents and the 
policy of the state or private school. Parental objections may arise with regard to 
the teaching of a particular religion or the content of various aspects of the 
curriculum.232 For example, recently, the use of certain types of books such as 
the Harry Potter series in the school curriculum has been seen by some parents 
as encouraging an interest in the occult.233 The infliction or non-infliction of 
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corporal punishment in the educational system has also raised parental concerns 
depending on the beliefs of the parents. Therefore, there is a considerable range 
of issues that bring the beliefs and rights of parents, the child and the role of the 
state to the fore. While the aspects of education that are controversial seem to be 
limited in South African jurisprudence, we will also consider the more 
controversial issue in comparable jurisdictions. 
 
In the case of Wittmann v Deutscher Schulverein, Pretoria, the Transvaal High 
Court had to deal with a case concerning an exception from mandatory religious 
instruction.234 The mother of a minor made an application to the court to have her 
daughter exempted from religious classes on the basis that the religious 
instruction offered by the independent German school, was not in accordance 
with her beliefs.235 From the facts of the case it is not clear whether the child 
shared the religious convictions of her mother but one may infer from one of the 
incidences she that she did. The court however approached the matter from the 
parental right perspective and noted that while section 14, freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion, afforded the parent the right to 
have a her daughter exempted from attendance at religious instruction classes 
and observances, by subjecting herself to the school constitution and regulation, 
the mother had effectively waived her ancillary right for her daughter not to attend 
these classes.236   
 
While the Wittmann was decided on such a narrow point, it is debatable whether 
the child herself was bound by her mother’s waiver. The case is made more 
complex by the fact that the court was dealing with a private school and not an 
organ of state as there is no doubt that had the school been an organ of state 
the actions of the school in providing compulsory religious education may have 
been suspect. Given that it was an independent institution established for the 
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main purpose of transmitting German linguistic and cultural heritage intervention 
by the State would have been unconstitutional. In other jurisdictions, control 
over the content of the school curriculum and activities remains an important 
issue for families with deeply held religious beliefs.  
 
In the United States for example, since the early cases of Meyer v. Nebraska 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, in which the Supreme Court confirmed that, 
while the State had a valid interest in ensuring that children receive some form 
of education, it could not seize the parents' primary duty to direct that 
education’.237 Today, the relationship between the state and parents is 
constantly under pressure with parents questioning the role of the state on a 
number of key educational issues. Not only in the United States but in Europe 
and even in South Africa the content of ‘health education’, ‘sex education’ or ‘life 
orientation’ classes has raise questions about the values children are taught.238  
 
In the Danish Sex Education case, the European Human Rights Court found 
that the integration of sex education into the school curriculum, from which 
children could not be excused, did not constitute a failure to respect parent’s 
convictions on the matter.239 Kilkelly has argued that, in this case, the manner in 
which the instruction was provided was decisive as it did not attempt to 
indoctrinate a particular moral attitude, but merely conveyed information.240 In 
the courts view the integration of the subject into the school curriculum did not 
affect the parents’ right to 
Enlighten and advise their children, to exercise with regard to their children 
natural parental functions as educators or to guide their children on a path in 
line with their own religious and philosophical convictions.241
In other instances cases have arisen in the United States and in Canada in 
which the state has sought to exert more influence over the content of the 
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curricula and the manner of instruction used by home schooling parents.242 In 
the American case of Wisconsin v Yoder, Amish parents claimed that 
Wisconsin’s compulsory education law, which required parents to ensure that 
their children attend public or private school until the age of sixteen, violated 
their free exercise rights.243 The parents argued that their faith required them to 
raise their children for ‘life in a church community separate and apart from the 
world and worldly influences’ and that attendance at a regular high school would 
expose their children to worldly influences during the crucial adolescent stage of 
development, developing values rejected as influences that alienate man from 
God. 244 The Court held the law affirmatively compelled the parents, under the 
threat of criminal sanction to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental 
tenets of their religious beliefs and that the State had to show that it had an 
interests ‘of the highest order…not otherwise served’ in applying its regulations 
to the Amish, however reasonable those regulations might be as a means of 
securing an appropriate education for children.245 The state had not provided 
sufficient evidence to show that overriding the religious rights of the parents was 
necessary to further its interests, and so awarded the Amish an exemption from 
compulsory school attendance laws.246  
 
Yoder effectively held that aspects of religious parenting are especially 
deserving of constitutional protection. As a result, in the United States parental 
rights have been recognised and protected under the Fourteenth Amendment 
from unnecessary state interference in four areas: (1) educational choices; (2) 
religious matters; (3) citizenship, including morals; and (4) issues concerning 
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sex.247 This is not to say that parental rights are absolute, the American 
constitutional guarantees with regard to parental religious rights are somewhat 
different to South African protections which need to survive the limitations 
clause.  
 
In the case of Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education, the 
applicant argued that the Schools Act248, which prohibited corporal punishment in 
schools, violated the rights of parents of children at independent schools who, in 
line with their religious convictions, consented to its use.249 While the 
Constitutional Court recognised the sincerity of the religious beliefs of the 
applicants, it held that freedom of religion like any under right in the Constitution 
was not absolute and could be limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
In the Court’s view the limitation that had been imposed on the applicants by the 
Schools Act was justifiable in that it attempted to promote respect for the dignity 
and physical and emotional integrity of all children.250 According to the court, the 
parents were not being forced to make an absolute and strenuous choice 
between obeying the law of the land and following their conscious.251 The 
judgement left open the question whether physical punishment in the home was 
justifiable.  
 
There is no doubt that balancing parental religious beliefs about education and 
other aspects of child rearing with recognition of the rights of the child and state 
interests remains a daunting task for courts. This is especially the case when 
there is a conflict between the beliefs of the parents and the legitimate aims of 
the state. A fine balance needs to be drawn between respecting the rights of 
parents, who frequently have the best interests of their children at heart and 
intervention obligations of the state when parents undermine the best interest of 
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the child. Outside of the educational issues the issue of parental beliefs with 
regard to medical treatment is becoming an increasingly common issue before 
the courts.  
4.6 Conclusion 
Religious and philosophical convictions of parents underpin various decisions 
that they make with regard to their children. At the same time belonging to a 
religious or cultural community can also provide the child with a sense of 
belonging and can provide the child the cultural resources to reinforce the child’s 
developing identity.252 Like culture, religious beliefs define societal 
understandings of the parent-child relationship and in turn at the larger level the 
relationship between the family and the state. This chapter has shown that South 
African while South African law recognises and protects the religious rights of 
parents with regard to their children, these rights are by no means absolute. By 
focusing on the controversial issue of religious rights with respect to education 
this paper has argued that unlike American jurisprudence, South African courts 
are more willing to fetter parental rights where exercise of these rights 
undermines legitimate state interests in protecting children or where the exercise 
is seen to undermine the best interests of the child.  
 
However, this chapter has also attempted to show the difficulties that arise with 
such willingness by the courts to intervene. Using the example of the Kotze case 
we argued that the courts should enforced the divorce clause as it did not 
undermine the best interests of the child. This approach was advocated for 
because given the centrality of religion in the lives of many South Africans and its 
implications for individual and group identity, the approach followed by the Court 
in Kotze may be misconstrued as being anti-religion. However, in all the other 
cases it was evident that the law recognises that parents have legally protected 
interests in providing their children with the moral guidance and direction with 
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regard to their identity formation and decision making matters. However, like any 
right these parental rights are limited by state interests in protecting the best 
interests of the child.  
 
This paper has shown that the attempt to balance the competing interests can be 
a daunting task within the constitutional framework with the battle between the 
state, the parents and the child him/herself. Religious beliefs of parents, while in 
most instances protecting the best interests of the child may be the source of 
isolating the child from external sources of help when parental actions are 
contrary to the best interest of the child. This is especially the case when one is 
dealing with parents or families that have deeply held convictions. In the area of 
formal education, this balancing process raises questions about who should have 
the final say. If we accept that parents or families are best equipped to decide on 
the religious instruction of their children we run the risk elevating religious rights 
above the best interests of the child. However, equally undesirable, if we take 
drastically fetter with parental power, we run the risk of undermining one of the 
fundamental human rights which hold up the fabric of the family unit, the very unit 
that society relies upon to care for the young.  
 
What if needed is an approach that adequately recognises religious and cultural 
diversity without undermining the rights of the child and such an approach is fully 
articulated in the South African Constitution and the CRC which requires the best 
interests of the child to be the primary consideration in all matters. The best 
interests’ principle provides a relatively objective solution to reconciling religious 
rights with the rights of the child. As we have already noted in the introductory 
section of this chapter if South African society is to be open and democratic in 
the fullest sense it must be tolerant and accepting of the different religious beliefs 
that exist in our society. However, this recognition cannot be justified if it 
sacrifices the rights of children in order to acknowledge diversity. South African 
courts have done well in comparison to its American counterparts in their 
willingness to actively engage with the competing interests to better serve the 
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best interests of the child. What is clear is that the issue of religion and children’s 
right will forever remain a deeply contentious issue in all societies.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The defence of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for human dignity. It 
implies a commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities and those of indigenous peoples. No one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe 
upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their scope.  
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001)
 
The CRC establishes a universal standard for children’s rights. The existence of 
this universal standard however, does not suggest that children’s rights can be or 
should be abstracted from their social or cultural contexts.253 Religious and 
cultural difference in the world forces courts to confront some of the difficult 
questions about universality in children’s rights. This paper has attempted to 
explore the influence of religious and cultural values in our understanding of 
universal norms and rights.  
 
By looking at some of the most progressive judgments on children’s rights in the 
South African jurisprudence, this thesis has shown that while culture and religion 
are often seen as undermining the normative value and practical utility of 
children’s rights, cultural and religious difference is an escapable aspect of 
children’s rights discourse.254 Exploring various aspects of cultural and religious 
values this paper has shown that agreement on the universal relevance and 
applicability of children’s rights norms does not in itself translate into consensus 
on the more concrete questions about these rights. If anything, the 
universalisation and the resultant constitutionalisation of children’s rights in South 
Africa requires that the issue of cultural difference be confronted in a pragmatic 
manner. This is so because while the focus may be on state responsibilities at 
the international level, at the implementation/grassroots level, where it matters 
most, the ‘private’ realm of family life remains the last preserve of firmly 
entrenched cultural values and traditions.255  Cultural and religious values are 
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often deeply set and soon become part of the individual or communal identity. 
When these values interact with other competing value systems the result is 
often either a facilitation or frustration of one by the other. This thesis has shown 
that South African law has attempted to accommodate culture and religion in 
children’s rights discourse and the approach of the courts has had differing 
implications on South African family law as a whole.  
 
In the chapter on the family this paper explored the family, it protection as a unit 
in the South African Constitution and the implications of its protection on the 
rights of the child. This chapter argued that protection of the family entailed 
protection of both the family as a unit and protection of its individual members.256 
South African jurisprudence on the right to family life has been propelled to a 
large extent by children’s rights discourse. In the past protection of the family was 
rooted in the recognition blood ties and the marital union. Today, the protection of 
family life embraces a wide range of family structures and family forms that go 
beyond the traditional nuclear family.257 Outside of recognition of the right to 
dignity in defining the concept of family, various children’s rights principles have 
been used by South African courts to afford different forms of parent-child 
relationships protection under the Constitutional provisions. However, while 
South African family law has progressed, it is evident that the nuclear family 
continues to enjoy more protection than the extended family that exists in various 
South African cultural communities. This paper argued that if the right to parental 
and family care are to be taken seriously, there is a need for the law to recognise 
the increasing role that grandparents and other family members play in the care 
of young children. Such recognition has important implications not only for these 
other family members but for children themselves who have a right to be cared 
for by their families, however family may be defined.  
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The protection of the right to culture in the South African Constitution has often 
been seen as militating against women and children’s rights. In South Africa, the 
application of customary law in family law issues such as the law of succession 
has yielded a considerable amount of debate about the compatibility of this 
system of law with children’s rights. Using the cases of Mthembu and Bhe, this 
thesis argued that the tendency to put customary law and constitutional principle 
of equality on a collision course may undermine the best interests of the child.258 
This paper argued that South African courts have failed to reconcile the right to 
culture with the rights of the child. It argued that similar to the issue of family, the 
law had a strong bias towards the common law and this oversight by the courts 
has the tendency to undermine the difference conceptions of children and their 
rights which exits between the common law and customary law. It suggested that 
a more accommodative approach to the principles and values of the positive 
aspects of customary law may serve the best interests of the child. As such, it 
advocated the idea that it is possible to reconcile customary law values with the 
rights of the child. It argued that the positive aspects of African culture should be 
protected. Courts should be able to apply the underlying principles and values 
that are being protected by customary practices that seem to be contrary to 
constitutional values. Furthermore, customary law must not be treated as a static 
system of law that is out of touch with the current lives of the people. While the 
paper does not suggest that customary law should be protected at all costs, it 
highlights that the best interest principle as a principle that exists in both the 
common law and in customary law, has different conceptions in both systems of 
law and it is important for courts to remain aware of this least their judgments 
become ineffectual.  
 
When it comes to parental religious rights and the rights of the child, it was 
shown that parental religious beliefs have important implications for various 
aspects of children’s rights and the exercise of their own rights under 
international human rights law. One of the most difficult questions in South 
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African children’s rights jurisprudence is how to balance the constitutional and 
common law rights of parents and the rights of children without undermining one 
at the expense of another. On the one hand, religious and cultural beliefs form an 
integral part of the individual and communal identity and as such are afforded 
considerable recognition and protection in international human rights law and in 
the South African Constitution. On the other hand, they may conflict with 
fundamental rights and state interests in advancing human rights or protecting 
the best interests of the child when such values conflict with others. By looking at 
the influence of parental religious rights in the area of education, this thesis 
showed that such rights can either frustrate or facilitate the best interests of the 
child. The balancing of children’s interests, parent’s interests and state interests 
in the lives of children remains a constant battle that South African and other 
courts have to confront.  
 
Religious and cultural values held by individuals and communities represent are 
more than mere lifestyle choices; they are a source of individual and communal 
worldviews that are as valid as other sources. The interaction of these values 
systems with international humanitarian and domestic constitutional law in the 
realm of children’s rights raises fundamental questions about the extent to which 
universal standards on abstract principles and norms can translate into 
uniformity. The answer in this thesis is that the universality of children’s rights 
cannot be and must not be misconstrued to be a quest for blind uniformity. In as 
much as states are diverse at the international level, at the local level families 
and communities are diverse. While they are all bound by the same South 
African Constitution, their conception of childhood, parenthood and its 
entitlements define their understanding of the best interests of the child. 
However, in recognition of cultural diversity it is essential that cultural and 
religious difference not be used to undermine fundamental rights of children. This 
paper has argued that what is positive in these values must be preserved 
however, that which is contrary to the best interests of the child must rejected.  
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